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Claim Durability and Bankruptcy’s Tort Problem 
Vincent S.J. Buccola† & Joshua C. Macey†† 
Bankruptcy has a tort problem. Chapter 11 predictably subordinates 
the claims of tort and other involuntary creditors to those of financial lend-
ers, a fact which encourages firms to rely excessively on secured debt and 
discount the interests of those they might incidentally harm. For this rea-
son, many scholars have advocated changing repayment priorities to move 
tort creditors to the front of the line. But despite broad academic support 
for a new “super priority,” the idea has yet to inspire legislative action. 
This Article proposes an alternative solution rooted in tort claims’ 
temporal durability. Chapter 11 subordinates tort claims only because of a 
convention that assets should emerge free-and-clear of prepetition debts if 
those who control the reorganization so elect. Bankruptcy courts could 
buck the convention and insist that tort claims follow a debtor’s assets out 
of Chapter 11 unless a deal otherwise is struck. The theoretical insight mo-
tivating our proposal is that durability and priority are close substitutes. In 
broad strokes, a super-durability norm should produce similar effects to a 
super-priority rule. In some respects, using durability may in fact be supe-
rior. It could avoid the need for costly, inaccurate judicial efforts to esti-
mate the extent of debtors’ tort liability. It could also be implemented by 
judicial fiat and without new legislation. Whatever one thinks of imple-
mentation, taking claim durability seriously as a design variable raises 
questions—and extends recent debates—about when bankruptcy law 
needs to crystallize otherwise fluid legal relationships to achieve its ends. 
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Five months after the New Yorker surfaced allegations of sexual im-
propriety against Harvey Weinstein,1 the famed producer’s firm, the Wein-
stein Company, filed for bankruptcy.2 New leadership was needed. A sale 
of the business as a going concern promised to best preserve its value.3 But 
why route the transaction through bankruptcy? One does not generally in-
voke Chapter 11 to sell a business. State law usually suffices. The Weinstein 
Company, a Delaware LLC, could have been sold under the eye of the able 
Court of Chancery.4 What the Company got from bankruptcy was neither 
especially sound execution nor especially prudent review. What it got was 
a way to transfer wealth from Mr. Weinstein’s alleged victims, many of 
whom had colorable claims against the Company, to the Company’s finan-
cial creditors.  
 
 1. Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s 
Accusers Tell Their Story, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories 
[https://perma.cc/T64Y-DEKT]. 
 2. Declaration of Robert Del Genio in Support of First Day Relief ¶ 46, In re Weinstein 
Co., No. 18-10601 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 20, 2018). 
 3. Id. ¶ 4 (explaining that the reason to file was “to permit an orderly sale of substantially 
all of the Debtors’ assets . . . in order to maximize the value of the estate for the benefit of creditors 
and other stakeholders”). 
 4. Indeed, the Company seems to have been lining up a sale outside bankruptcy until the 
putative buyer reneged at the last minute. Id. ¶¶ 50-63. 
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If the Weinstein Company had been sold outside bankruptcy, the 
women might have sought damages from the buyer, as successor-in-inter-
est.5 The Company used Chapter 11 to rule out that possibility.6 It was not 
a novel tactic. Bankruptcy is often used to extinguish claims that might oth-
erwise follow a distressed business.7 Buyers will offer a premium for im-
munity. Presumably the Company fetched more in Chapter 11 than it 
would have had it been sold in the ordinary course. Because sale proceeds 
are applied first to satisfy senior creditors, the predictable effect of using 
bankruptcy was to increase the secured lenders’ recoveries at the tort 
plaintiffs’ expense.8 
The dynamic underlying the Weinstein Company case is an example 
of bankruptcy’s tort problem.9 As it is practiced, Chapter 11 subordinates 
tort and other involuntary creditors, who often receive token recoveries no 
matter how objectionable the conduct giving rise to their claims may be. 
The ability to shed tort and environmental obligations in bankruptcy 
creates a judgment-proof problem.10 In a world of limited liability for 
shareholders and priority for secured creditors, tort victims bear insol-
vency risk. They must bear the costs of injury if the tortfeasor’s assets are 
insufficient. Yet they are not paid for doing so. Business managers there-
fore face an asymmetry in the way investors—broadly understood to in-
clude involuntary investors—respond to balance-sheet risk. Financial lend-
ers charge less interest if they will be repaid first, but involuntary creditors 
cannot charge more for being made to rank last. To exploit the asymmetry, 
 
 5. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. See generally, e.g., Complaint, Geiss v. 
Weinstein Co., No. 1:17-cv-9554, 2017 WL 6034904 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2017). 
 6. The plaintiffs must decide whether to accept a total of $17 million to be funded pri-
marily by the Company’s insurers. Jonathan Randles, Harvey Weinstein’s Victims Should Vote 
on Settlement Offer, Judge Says, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/harvey-
weinsteins-victims-should-vote-on-settlement-offer-judge-says-11603227477 
[https://perma.cc/C7ET-GBW3].  
 7. Vincent S.J. Buccola, Bankruptcy’s Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Distress, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 705, 732-39 (2019). Another reason debtors with substantial tort 
obligations file for bankruptcy protection is to release third parties of liability. For background, 
see Comm’n to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, Final Report and Recommendations, AM. 
BANKR. INST. 253-55 (2014). For a critical discussion, see Lindsey D. Simon, Bankruptcy Grifters 
(2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 8. The bankruptcy judge approved a sale of the business to Lantern Capital for $289 mil-
lion. Order, In re Weinstein Co., No. 18-10601 (Bankr. D. Del. May 9, 2018); see Gene Maddaus, 
Weinstein Co. Closes $289 Million Sale to Lantern Capital, VARIETY (July 16, 2018), https://vari-
ety.com/2018/biz/news/weinstein-co-closes-1202873818 [https://perma.cc/8SWN-232U]. 
 9. We use “tort” expansively to include debts not established under a contractual or oth-
erwise reciprocal framework. Thus, we include, for example, environmental and regulatory debts. 
Cf. Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 
199-200 (2019) (describing prospect of free-and-clear disposition as a disincentive to comply with 
environmental laws). 
 10. S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 45 (1986). 
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profit-maximizing companies will tend to employ excessive leverage and 
discount the harms they may inflict on others.11 
Bankruptcy’s tort problem has taken on new urgency in recent years. 
It first emerged as a challenge in the 1980s with the asbestos cases. The 
toxin’s ubiquity and long latency period between exposure and serious ill-
ness posed conceptual as well as institutional challenges for reorganization 
practice.12 Recently, however, the treatment of tort and other involuntary 
claims has emerged as the key theme of bankruptcies spanning a wide 
range of industries and sources of obligation—from responsibility for coal 
cleanup13 and wildfire deaths14 to liability for opioid abuse,15 child moles-
tation,16 and sexual assault.17 
Scholars have long understood that bankruptcy can prevent compa-
nies from bearing many of the social costs of their behavior. Two remedial 
proposals have proved influential. One idea, most closely identified with 
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman,18 is to abolish limited liability 
for corporate torts—to allow tort victims to recover from shareholders the 
balance of any judgment a primary corporate wrongdoer’s assets prove 
 
 11. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority 
of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 867 (1996); infra Section I.A.1. 
 12. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 847 
(1984); Christopher M.E. Painter, Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Credit System: As-
bestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1062 (1984). The “future claimant” 
problem pits those whose claims have matured at the time of a company’s bankruptcy against 
those whose claims are contingent or unmatured. It implicates the interests of tort creditors (as a 
class) to the extent there is a lag between unlawful conduct and injury. But it is fundamentally a 
conflict between earlier-in-time and later-in-time creditors (all of whom might be tort creditors). 
Our interest in this Article is in conflict between higher- and lower-priority creditors, so we will 
not treat future claimant issues further. The curious reader should start with Mark J. Roe’s article 
and Frederick Tung, Taking Future Claims Seriously: Future Claims and Successor Liability in 
Bankruptcy, 49 CASE W. L. REV. 435 (1999). Kenneth Ayotte and Yair Listokin should be con-
sulted on trust design. See Kenneth Ayotte & Yair Listokin, Optimal Trust Design in Mass Tort 
Bankruptcy, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 403 (2005); Yair Listokin & Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting 
Future Claimants in Mass Tort Bankruptcies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1435 (2004) [hereinafter Listokin 
& Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants]. 
 13. See Joshua C. Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Bankruptcy as Bailout: Coal Company 
Insolvency and the Erosion of Federal Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 879 (2019).  
 14. See Derek Hawkins, PG&E Reaches $13.5 Billion Settlement with California Wild-
fire Victims, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/12/06/pge-
reaches-billion-settlement-with-california-wildfire-victims [https://perma.cc/B9V3-LSW2].  
 15. See Gerald Posner & Ralph Brubaker, Opinion, The Sacklers Could Get Away with 
It, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/22/opinion/sacklers-opioid-epi-
demic.html [https://perma.cc/7H6L-L4NR]. 
 16. See Mike Baker, At Stake in Boy Scouts’ Bankruptcy: $1 Billion in Assets, or Much 
More, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/19/us/boy-scouts-bank-
ruptcy-assets.html [https://perma.cc/7A9A-Z9UU]; see also Pamela Foohey, Bankrupting the 
Faith, 78 MO. L. REV. 719, 731-32 (2013) (reporting nineteen church bankruptcies stemming from 
sexual abuse claims between 2006-2011). 
 17. See Megan Twohey & Jodi Kantor, Weinstein and His Accusers Reach Tentative $25 
Million Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/11/us/harvey-wein-
stein-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/EA8R-CBF6]. 
 18. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liabil-
ity for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991). 
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insufficient to pay.19 The primary alternative, first developed by F.H. Buck-
ley,20 Kathryn Heidt,21 and David Leebron,22 is to establish a statutory su-
per-priority for tort claims.23 Both proposals can be shown to improve man-
agers’ incentives, at least in principle.24 The super-priority’s appeal in 
particular has become an article of faith among bankruptcy scholars with a 
wide range of perspectives.25 Academic popularity has not, however, trans-
lated into legislative action. 
This Article proposes and explores the merits of establishing what we 
call a super-durability norm. The idea is to insist that tort claims follow a 
debtor’s assets through and beyond Chapter 11, attaching to the reor-
ganized debtor or, in case of a going-concern sale, to the buyer. Tort cred-
itors would in effect choose whether to litigate against the post-bankruptcy 
company or accept what those in control of the Chapter 11 process offer to 
resolve the claims. The advantage of super-durability over the status quo 
inheres in the bargaining parameters it would underwrite. In brief, the par-
ties’ estimates of the magnitude of liability could be expected to ground 
settlement discussions. Today, by contrast, the amount of liability is almost 
irrelevant in many cases. A debtor’s insurance coverage rather than its 
fault determines what tort creditors can hope to recover. 
The central motivating insight is that durability and priority are close 
substitutes. At first approximation, a super-durability norm would improve 
incentives the same way as a super-priority rule. It would increase tort 
creditors’ recoveries at the expense of financial lenders’ recoveries. Lend-
ers would thus have to recalibrate. They would have to increase interest 
rates or mandate more insurance for leveraged borrowers. They would 
have reason to insist on, and borrowers would have reason to agree to, 
cost-effective prophylactic measures. Despite such measures, however, 
risky businesses would see their capital costs grow and their footprints 
shrink. In short, they would better internalize the costs of the risks they 
impose if tort claims enjoyed either greater priority or durability. 
 
 19. Id. Mark Roe suggested a similar doctrinal innovation, for similar reasons, five years 
earlier in response to the asbestos bankruptcies. See Mark J. Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction 
to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1, 40-42 (1986); cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Lim-
ited Liability and the Corporation, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 107 (1985) (arguing that “the magni-
tude” of limited liability’s tort problem “is reduced by corporations’ incentives to insure”). 
 20. F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1986). 
 21. Kathryn R. Heidt, Cleaning up Your Act: Efficiency Considerations in the Battle for 
the Debtor’s Assets in Toxic Waste Bankruptcies, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 819 (1988) (focusing on 
environmental claims). 
 22. David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1565 (1991). 
 23. The first suggestion of a super-priority rule seems to have been in a student note in 
the Stanford Law Review. See Painter, supra note 12, at 1080-81. 
 24. See infra Section I.B. 
 25. See infra Section I.B.2. 
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Nevertheless, a super-durability norm might in fact be superior to a 
super-priority rule. For one thing, it does not require costly and inaccurate 
estimation procedures. A super-priority rule depends on just that. It calls 
on the bankruptcy judge to reduce to a point estimate her intuitions about 
how underlying causes of action would fare in a counterfactual world 
where they were prosecuted in state court. Valuation is, of course, a staple 
of bankruptcy practice. But it is not an especially reliable or attractive part 
of the practice.26 A super-priority rule would expand its domain to a realm 
where even the limited discipline of discounted cash-flow analysis is ab-
sent. Tort verdicts are notoriously uncertain. Lenders would be motivated 
to influence the judicial assessment. Whether dispersed, involuntary claim-
ants would adequately protect their collective interests is an open ques-
tion.27 In any event, the process would be expensive. Under a super-dura-
bility norm, by contrast, valuation would be left to the parties. If no deal 
were reached, the default would not be a hearing; the tort claimants would 
simply wait for the firm to emerge from bankruptcy and bring suit against 
the successor entity.28 A durability norm could thus encourage bargaining 
over litigation. 
Moreover, a super-durability norm would not face the political-econ-
omy barriers that have frustrated super-priority proposals. The features of 
Chapter 11 that extinguish tort claims depend on judicial approval. Judicial 
disapproval could be the beginning of a super-durability norm. The buck 
could start with the bench even absent legislative action.  
To be sure, judicial implementation of a super-durability norm would 
face its own hurdles. In a world of liberal forum-selection rules, the norm 
could be expected to have real bite in large cases only if its wisdom were 
widely recognized. Judicial implementation would also require upsetting 
established patterns of practice. In the modern era, bankruptcy judges have 
been generally willing to extinguish claims at the behest of a sale or plan 
proponent.29 Their deferential attitude is consistent with the dictum that 
bankruptcy officials ought to do what they can to “maximize the value of 
 
 26. For discussions of costs entailed by and sources of inaccuracy and imprecision in 
bankruptcy valuation, see Kenneth Ayotte, Disagreement and Capital Structure Complexity, 49 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2020); Kenneth Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Valuation Disputes in Corpo-
rate Bankruptcy, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1819 (2018); and Anthony J. Casey & Julia Simon-Kerr, A 
Simple Theory of Complex Valuation, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1188-89 (2015). 
 27. An adequately funded statutory representative of tort claimants could mitigate their 
collective-action and liquidity problems.  
 28. In cases where the tort creditors themselves face a holdout problem, a committee or 
voting process could be used, either in an advisory or binding manner. 
 29. Reorganized firms frequently assume some prepetition obligations voluntarily. See 
Mark J. Roe & Joo-Hee Chung, How the Chrysler Reorganization Differed from Prior Practice, 
5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 399, 416-26 (2013) (tabulating data from large-corporate bankruptcies re-
solved through section 363 sale). But they do so to maintain a relationship with an important coun-
terparty or to buy labor peace. Tort claims are not usually among the obligations voluntarily as-
sumed, because most businesses have no relationship-specific investment in their tort creditors.  
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the estate.”30 Super-durability works precisely because it does not maxim-
ize the estate’s saleable value. Its logic thus implies a qualification to pre-
vailing ideas. If bankruptcy aims to put resources to their highest-value use, 
asset-value, not estate-value, should guide discretion.31 
One has to be careful, though, not to overstate the novelty of the ju-
dicial attitude we propose. The attitude is in fact deeply rooted in reorgan-
ization law. As far back as the railroad equity receiverships, courts have 
been willing to recognize extraordinary claim durability to ensure that dis-
favored creditors receive fair treatment. Indeed, the upshot of the most 
famous of all the receivership cases, Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd, was 
that an empty-handed tort creditor could assert the full amount of his claim 
against a reorganized company notwithstanding the fact of an intervening 
foreclosure sale.32 Boyd featured a creditor whom the reorganization had 
completely shut out even as it distributed value to shareholders, treatment 
the absolute priority rule today would prevent.33 Nevertheless, the case—
and its forebears—can be read broadly to condone super-durability as a 
judicial strategy for ensuring a claim’s fair treatment.34 
The prospect of a durability norm for tort claims has implications for 
bankruptcy theory whatever one ultimately makes of the idea. In recent 
years, prominent scholars have joined a debate on the wisdom of the abso-
lute priority rule.35 Critics of the rule object to the assumption embedded 
in it that bankruptcy must collapse future possibilities to achieve its ends. 
Bankruptcy can be imagined as a sieve. The critics reason that junior in-
vestors’ optionality can pass through the sieve without threatening any of 
reorganization law’s cardinal functions. This Article is, among other things, 
a provocation to widen the terms of debate. Our narrow thesis is that law 
 
 30. See, e.g., In re Pursuit Capital Mgmt., LLC, 595 B.R. 631, 659 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018) 
(declaring one of two “primary goals” of the Bankruptcy Code “to maximize the value of the 
estate for the benefit of creditors”). 
 31. Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Bankruptcy Firm, 167 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 5-8 (2019). 
Bankruptcy officials should also consider the perverse incentives a strict value-maximization norm 
generates. 
 32. 228 U.S. 482, 502 (1913); cf. R.R. Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 392 (1869) (holding 
that beneficiaries of a railroad’s guarantees could assert claims against purchasers of the railroad’s 
assets at foreclosure sale). 
 33. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2018). 
 34. See Douglas G. Baird, The Unwritten Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 36 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 699, 709-10 (2020). 
 35. Important contributions include Barry E. Adler & George Triantis, Debt Priority 
and Options in Bankruptcy: A Policy Intervention, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563 (2017); Douglas G. 
Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization 
Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930 (2006); Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preser-
vation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759 (2011); Anthony J. Casey & Joshua C. Macey, 
The Hertz Maneuver (and the Limits of Bankruptcy Law), U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE *1 (2020); 
Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 
11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014); Douglas G. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute Priority, 
Relative Priority, and the Costs of Bankruptcy, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 785 (2017); and Jonathan M. 
Seymour & Steven L. Schwarcz, Corporate Restructuring Under Absolute and Relative Priority 
Default Rules: A Comparative Assessment, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 1. 
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might work better if tort claims can flow through the bankruptcy sieve. 
More broadly, though, we hope to show by illustration that the absolute 
priority rule is but one example of Chapter 11’s general tendency to trun-
cate open-ended legal relationships.36 The general question—which in our 
view has yet to receive a satisfactory general answer—is which legal rela-
tionships ought to flow through the bankruptcy sieve and which, by con-
trast, the law must crystallize and resolve. 
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I lays the foundation. It ex-
plains the problem and reviews the relevant academic literature. Part II 
sets out our proposal. It outlines two mechanisms by which bankruptcy 
judges could promote super-durability within the confines of existing law. 
Part III assesses the significance of a super-durability norm. It shows that 
in many cases, such a norm would force debtors and creditors to internalize 
some of the social costs of business and facilitate bargaining between tort 
claimants and other creditors. It then discusses more complex scenarios—
in particular, where there is contingent or otherwise unknown liability, 
asymmetric information about the nature of liability, or what we call hot 
potato assets. Part IV addresses the chief practical objections to our pro-
posal: counter-strategies managers and financial creditors might adopt to 
frustrate our proposal. We conclude that a presumption in favor of super-
durability would do much to solve bankruptcy’s tort problem. 
I. Bankruptcy’s Tort Problems 
The bankruptcy process systematically undercompensates tort credi-
tors. By definition, a company’s insolvency implies that not everyone can 
be repaid in full. However, not only do tort creditors typically recover less 
than one hundred cents on the dollar, but they recover less relative to other 
claimants than they ought to. We are by no means the first to say so. The 
predominant academic view holds, in response, that tort claims should 
have first dibs on a bankrupt debtor’s resources.37 Parts II and III outline 
and assess ways to implement a similar norm without congressional action. 
First, we set the stage with an account of the problem—its legal source and 
economic significance—and sketch the two leading, but seemingly infeasi-
ble, proposals to curb it. 
 
 36. Anthony Casey and Edward Morrison recently made just this point in another con-
text. See Anthony J. Casey & Edward R. Morrison, Beyond Options, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW 193 (Barry E. Adler ed., 2020) (examining truncation of sen-
ior creditors’ real option to foreclose). 
 37. See infra Section I.B.2. 
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A. The Culprits 
A common theme in corporate bankruptcies is that tort creditors fare 
poorly. Pennies on the dollar is standard compensation for prepetition in-
jury.38 The Weinstein Company case described above is a telling example 
but by no means unique. Black-letter doctrine and the bargaining dynamics 
of Chapter 11 ensure that tort creditors end up on the bottom of the heap. 
Two features of the legal landscape—shareholder limited liability and 
the priority of secured debt—are the primary culprits. Limited liability sets 
an upward limit on the recovery available to all creditors at the value of 
the debtor’s assets. In doing so, it prevents tort creditors from recovering 
from the debtor’s shareholders.39 The priority of secured debt means that 
creditors with a lien on an insolvent corporation’s property are entitled to 
the value of the encumbered property (up to the amount of the claim). To-
gether, the doctrine of limited liability and the priority afforded to secured 
creditors ensure that a bankrupt firm’s tort creditors’ compensation gener-
ally comes from whatever value remains after secured claims have been 
paid. Modern capital structures are often designed so there is little, if any, 
residual value left for tort creditors.40  
Tort creditors’ weak bargaining position also reduces the amount that 
they are able to recover from bankruptcy. In theory, unsecured creditors 
should share roughly pro rata in the residual value after secured claims are 
paid.41 In practice, however, tort claimants often fare worse than other un-
secured creditors because, almost by definition, they have nothing to offer 
a reorganizing enterprise. Other unsecured creditors, such as vendors, cus-
tomers, and employees, may continue to interact with the business. 
 
 38. Sometimes debtors, especially small businesses, file with (because of) a recent tort 
judgment. See List of Asbestos Bankruptcies, CROWELL MORING (2020), https://www.crow-
ell.com/files/list-of-asbestos-bankruptcy-cases-chronological-order.pdf [https://perma.cc/WL4V-
YA6Q] (listing all bankruptcies triggered by asbestos litigation). In many such cases we know the 
debtor’s tort liability. But in other cases, a debtor files before the claims are reduced to judgment. 
The liability can be estimated as part of the bankruptcy process, but it need not be if the plan of 
reorganization is consensual. See Kavya Balaraman, Judge Approves PG&E Wildfire Settle-
ments, Bringing Utility Closer to Exiting Bankruptcy, UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 18, 2019), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/bankruptcy-judge-approves-pge-wildfire-settlements-utility-re-
organization/569304 [https://perma.cc/CWA8-UXWH].  
 39. Veil piercing theory defines a gracious limit to limited liability. See Jonathan Macey 
& Joshua Mitts, Finding Order in the Morass: The Three Real Justifications for Piercing the Cor-
porate Veil, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 104-10 (2014). 
 40. See Vince Sullivan, Murray Energy Lenders Sue to Undo Prepetition Refinancing, 
LAW360 (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1221989/murray-energy-lenders-sue-to-
undo-prepetition-refinancing [https://perma.cc/PE2C-NEM8] (describing how Murray Energy re-
financed its debt shortly before filing for bankruptcy so that financial creditors would be paid be-
fore tort and environmental claimants). 
 41. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors,” 166 U. PA. L. 
REV. 699, 700 (2018). 
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Debtors often find ways to pay these claims in full.42 Not so with tort cred-
itors, whose claims are pure legacy liabilities and are treated as such. Their 
leverage, the right to block a plan of reorganization that “discriminate[s] 
unfairly” against them,43 is worth little in practice. Debtors take advantage 
of a variety of means to distribute value to the unsecured creditors they 
like best long before a plan of reorganization comes into view.44 
Moreover, investors’ expectations about how bankruptcy might affect 
competing claims informs capital-structure and investment decisions to the 
detriment of tort claimants. These decisions in turn increase the likelihood 
that a company will injure third parties and reduce the size of those victims’ 
recoveries.45 The basic problem—the reason we say tort creditors are un-
dercompensated—is that existing norms encourage the managers of, and 
investors in, leveraged companies to discount excessively the risks their 
businesses pose and to maintain potentially inefficient capital structures 
precisely in order to push risk onto third parties. 
To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical in a simple decision-
making environment (featuring risk-neutral agents with complete infor-
mation). Acme Corporation’s CEO, faithful to her shareholders, must de-
cide whether to create a new subsidiary to undertake a risky project. There 
are two relevant periods. In period 1, the CEO will decide whether to in-
vest in the project, which will cost $10,000 cash. In period 2, the project—
if the subsidiary invests—will either succeed or fail. If the project succeeds, 
it will yield an asset worth $14,000. If the project fails, it will yield an asset 
worth $10,000, but will also cause the company negligently to injure 
strangers to the tune of $4000.  
The social decision rule is straightforward. Success generates a net re-
turn of $4000; failure generates a net social cost of the same amount. Acme 
should invest in the project if and only if it has at least an even-odds chance 
of success. But limited liability and the priority of secured debt encourage 
the CEO to underweight the expected cost of failure, to impose more risk 
than is socially warranted. (For simplicity, we will leave it to the reader to 
model the impact of the bankruptcy bargaining dynamics described 
above.) 
 
 42. One reason debtors may try to pay certain unsecured creditors is that doing so can 
help preserve value. For example, a clothing manufacturer that purchases fabric on favorable 
terms from a fabric provider may want to continue paying the fabric manufacturer in order to 
avoid defaulting on the contract. See Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Janus Faces of Reorganization 
Law, 44 J. CORP. L. 1 (2018). 
 43. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2018). 
 44. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 41, at 714-20 (documenting the most common methods of 
subordinating disfavored unsecured creditors). 
 45. See Michael Ohlrogge, Insolvency and Incentives for Efficient Care (Mar. 1, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3136775 [https://perma.cc/K8F6-QME8] 
(finding that, as firms approach insolvency, they become more likely to violate environmental 
laws). 
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1. Perverse Effects of Limited Liability 
Consider first the CEO’s incentives if the project is to be financed en-
tirely with Acme’s equity capital (scenario 1). If the project succeeds, 
Acme, the subsidiary’s sole shareholder, nets $4000. It captures the full so-
cial benefit of the venture. If the project fails, Acme suffers the full social 
cost: the tort victims are made whole from the value of the subsidiary’s 
asset, leaving Acme with $6000 of value, for a loss of $4000. 
 
Scenario 1  
Assumptions: (1) 100% equity financing, (2) limited liability & (3) p = probability of success  




0 4000 – 4000 = 0 0 
Equity 14,000 – 10,000 = 4000 6000 – 10,000 = -
4000 




4000 -4000 (p)(4000) + (1–p)(-4000) 
Breakeven Probability: Socially-Optimal: /-in-1 (34%) vs. Equity: /-in-1 (34%) 
 
On these facts, Acme fully internalizes the risk the project imposes on 
strangers. The CEO makes the socially optimal choice, undertaking the 
project only if probability-weighted social benefits of success are more than 
harms of failure. 
The socially optimal result will not always hold, however. Suppose, 
for example, the same facts except that the project will yield a $30,000 asset 
if it succeeds and yield a $10,000 asset, but impose $20,000 of tort damages, 
if it fails (scenario 1a). The social benefits of success are still identical to 
the social harms of failure. A socially motivated executive would invest 
only if success were at least as likely as failure. But the CEO faithful to her 
shareholders’ pecuniary interests would think differently. If the project 
succeeded, Acme would reap the full $20,000 of benefit. If it failed, its loss 
would be capped at $10,000, the amount of invested capital. Acme would 
“externalize” the other $10,000 of social loss. A CEO seeking to maximize 
shareholder value would thus invest in the project if it had as little as a 1-
in-3 chance of success. 
The general rule is that shareholders of a company that finances its 
operations entirely with equity will underweight the costs their business 
imposes on strangers to the extent those costs might exceed the value of 
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the company’s assets.46 Nevertheless, in an all-equity financing structure, 
the interests of shareholders and strangers are reasonably aligned except 
in situations that might yield catastrophic mass liabilities. 
2. Perverse Effects of Secured Debt Priority 
Leveraged companies, especially those that rely heavily on secured 
debt, face more perverse incentives. To see this, consider a variation on the 
Acme hypothetical above. Suppose the company finds a lender that is will-
ing to put up $9000 of the $10,000 needed to finance the project. In ex-
change, the subsidiary must give a security interest in all of its assets and 
promise to repay the principal when the project is completed (scenario 2). 
(It is a 0%-interest loan.)47 
The payoffs in this scenario are as follows. If the project succeeds, the 
lender is paid in full ($9000) and the shareholders receive the residual 
$5000 of value on an investment of $1000. If the project fails, the picture is 
more complicated. The lender, having first priority in a bankruptcy, recov-
ers its full $9000 claim. (The loan is risk-free.) This means the tort victims 
recover only a fraction of their claim. The subsidiary has only $1000 of 
value left to be claimed, and limited liability insulates the shareholders 
from having to make up the difference. The shareholders, for their part, 
lose their $1000 investment. 
 
Scenario 2  
Assumptions: (1) 90/10 debt/equity, (2) limited liability & (3) p = probability of success  
 Value in Success Value in Failure Expected Value 
Tort Victims 0 1000 – 4000 = -3000 (1–p)(-3000) 
Lender 9000 – 9000 = 0 9000 – 9000 = 0 0 
Equity 5000 – 1000 = 4000 0 – 1000 = -1000 (p)(4000) + (1–p)(-
1000) 
Total Social Value 4000 -4000 (p)(4000) + (1–p)(-
4000) 
Breakeven Probability: Socially-Optimal: 1-in-2 (50%) vs. Equity: 1-in-5 (20%) 
 
The CEO’s calculus includes only one-fourth of the effect of the pro-
ject’s failure on the tort victims. She cares only about the fact that the 
shareholders stand to gain $4000 in case of success and to lose $1000 in case 
 
 46. Roe, supra note 19. The asbestos cases of the 1980s revealed instances of this pattern. 
Some of the opioid cases seem to share it. Purdue, at least, seems to have carried very little if any 
funded debt. 
 47. We use a zero-interest loan to abstract from questions of capital cost and so make a 
comparison of nominal returns instructive. In reality, of course, the financing choice would be a 
function in part of the relative cost of equity and debt capital.  
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of failure. She thus will invest if the project has as little as a 1-in-5 chance 
of success. 
The significance of secured debt under existing bankruptcy norms can 
be described in general terms: priority allows investors to externalize the 
risk that their business will create harms that exceed the difference be-
tween the value of the company’s assets and the face amount of secured 
claims.48 The ability to impose tortious harm can be understood as a special 
kind of capital; it is an input to production. But because the size of a tort 
judgment does not scale with the tortfeasor’s credit risk, the price of tort 
to the company is invariant to a company’s leverage. Two conclusions fol-
low. Companies will tend to take on more leverage than is socially opti-
mal,49 and leveraged companies will tend to impose more tort risk than is 
socially optimal.50 
B. Extant Proposed Responses 
The academic literature first recognized bankruptcy’s tort problem in 
the 1980s, during the wave of asbestos filings.51 Since then, scholars have 
proposed two solutions. Each proposal targets one of the two issues (lim-
ited liability and a priority claim for secured creditors) we identified above. 
The proposals, especially proposals to grant tort creditors a super-priority 
claim, enjoy broad academic support. We think both proposals would im-
prove on the status quo, though both have very real downsides. Unlimited 
liability for corporate torts might make it more difficult for firms to raise 
capital. A super-priority for tort claims might force involuntary creditors 
to engage in costly and speculative valuation disputes. Moreover, it is not 
clear that either proposal could be implemented. And that proviso is fatal. 
Both proposals would require implementing legislation unlikely to come 
from Congress or the state capitals. 
1. Unlimited Shareholder Liability 
One suggestion, most closely identified with Henry Hansmann and 
Reinier Kraakman, would make shareholders liable on an unlimited basis 
 
 48. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 20, at 1417; Leebron, supra note 22, at 1568; Painter, 
supra note 12, at 1057. 
 49. The first to observe this fact, as far as we are aware, is James H. Scott, Jr., Bank-
ruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure, 32 J. FIN. 1, 2 (1977) (“By the issuance of 
secured debt, the firm can increase the value of its securities by reducing the amount available to 
pay legal damages in the event that the firm should go bankrupt.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social 
Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 32 (“To the extent that a firm knows that it will not have to fully 
compensate its future tort victims, it has too little incentive to take care to prevent accidents in the 
first instance.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 20; Heidt, supra note 21; Roe, supra note 12; Roe, supra 
note 19; Painter, supra note 12.  
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for a company’s tort liabilities.52 The logic of the proposal is straightfor-
ward. It would put shareholders as a group on the hook for a company’s 
torts one way or another—either indirectly if the company pays (since the 
value of their shares will decrease by the amount of the payment), or di-
rectly if it does not. Under a rule of unlimited liability, the priority of se-
cured debt is, at first approximation, irrelevant to tort creditors.53  
To see this, return to the hypothetical in which Acme’s leverage en-
couraged risk-taking, but now with a rule of unlimited shareholder liability 
(scenario 3). The way Acme’s value is distributed is identical to scenario 2. 
The lender is paid in full whether the project succeeds or fails. The share-
holders take $5000 in case of success, but lose their $1000 investment in 
case of failure. And the strangers injured in case of failure recover only 
$1000 of their $4000 claim. The difference is that now the tort victims re-
cover their $3000 deficiency claim from the shareholders in their individual 
capacities. 
 
Scenario 3  
Assumptions: (1) 90%/10% debt/equity, (2) unlimited liability & (3) p = probability of success  
 Value in Success Value in Failure Expected Value 
Tort Victims 0 (1000 + 3000) - 4000 = 0 0 
Lender 9000 – 9000 = 0 9000 – 9000 = 0 0 




4000 -4000 (p)(4000) + (1–p)(-
4000) 
Breakeven Probability: Socially-Optimal: 1-in-2 (50%) vs. Equity: 1-in-2 (50%) 
 
Shareholders reap the gains from success and bear the losses associ-
ated with failure. (The lender does not bear the losses associated with fail-
ure because the loan is risk-free.) Their payoffs reflect the social cost-ben-
efit trade-off, and the faithful CEO therefore has an incentive to choose 
well.  
In theory, unlimited shareholder liability could perfectly resolve 
bankruptcy’s tort problem. In practice, however, the rule would cause 
some problems of its own. Among other things, unlimited liability discour-
ages relatively wealthy investors, who anticipate being the primary targets 
of litigation, from owning shares alongside relatively judgment-proof 
 
 52. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18. Mark Roe seems to have first suggested the 
idea in response to the asbestos bankruptcies. See Roe, supra note 19, at 40-42.  
 53. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 1901-02; Leebron, supra note 22, 
at 1639. 
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investors.54 It encourages wealthy shareholders to spend resources moni-
toring their fellows and to arrange their own affairs to become as judg-
ment-proof as possible. Together these undermine the fungibility of shares, 
diminish the value of secondary markets, and so undermine to some extent 
the corporate form’s utility in promoting capital formation.55 Unlimited li-
ability may also be difficult to implement. The administrative costs of filing 
suits against potentially thousands of shareholders in multiple venues 
would be enormous.56 Legislation aimed at consolidation might drive in-
vestors offshore, making them effectively judgment proof.57 These chal-
lenges are, of course, only special instances of the generic downsides of 
unlimited shareholder liability.58 
Unlimited liability for corporate torts might yet on balance be good 
policy. Where share ownership is relatively concentrated—as, for example, 
in family- and private equity-owned companies—the advantages of limited 
liability are small and the costs of unlimited liability therefore modest. 
Even where share ownership is relatively diffuse, companies could dampen 
the rule’s side effects by keeping sufficient cash on hand or maintaining 
sufficient insurance to pay anticipated tort claims without opening re-
course to shareholders.  
But the question is moot. Such a radical change would require major 
legislative upheaval, probably on a state-by-state basis.59 It is unlikely to 
come soon.60 
 
 54. See Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. 
L. REV. 259, 262 (1967). 
 55. See Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of 
Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1980). 
 56. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural 
Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 418 (1992). 
 57. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 497 (2001); 
Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 
102 YALE L.J. 387, 396 (1992). 
 58. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 19, at 93-97. 
 59. The rule of limited liability is usually thought to be part of a corporation’s internal 
affairs. Its reach therefore has traditionally been a matter of the chartering state’s law. See Greg-
ory Scott Crespi, Choice of Law in Veil-Piercing Litigation: Why Courts Should Discard the In-
ternal Affairs Rule and Embrace General Choice-of-Law Principles, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 85 (2008). Presumably Congress could legislate on the topic. Vincent S.J. Buccola, Opportunism 
and Internal Affairs, 93 TUL. L. REV. 339, 346-48 (2018). Perhaps states could, too, with respect to 
torts committed in their respective territories. But legislation other than from chartering states 
would at least upend tradition.  
 60. If a state did abolish limited liability with respect to tort claimants, one would expect 
firms to reincorporate in states whose liability regimes were more favorable to equity. This “race 
to the bottom” would likely deter states from adopting such a radical reform unilaterally. See 
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 
(1974) (arguing that there is a race to the bottom among state incorporation laws); cf. Ralph K. 
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 251, 271 (1977) (arguing that there is a race to the top); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS 
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 21 (1993) (describing specific instances in which competition 
among states has led to a race to the bottom and instances in which it has led to a race to the top); 
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2. Super-Priority for Tort Creditors 
An alternative remedy for bankruptcy’s tort problem would grant tort 
and other involuntary creditors a super-priority lien on debtor assets.61 The 
idea is to expose involuntary creditors, who are not paid for taking on 
credit risk, to as little of it as possible. As with unlimited liability, the rule 
would make tort creditors indifferent to a company’s leverage. Secured 
credit could not be used to externalize tort risk. 
To see this, return to the Acme hypothetical, now with limited liability 
and a rule that requires that tort creditors be paid first from a debtor’s as-
sets (scenario 4). If the project succeeds, then, as before, the lender is re-
paid $9000 and the shareholders receive $5000. If the project fails, how-
ever, the tort creditors now recover their full damages ($4000). The lender 
takes the remaining $6000 of value. As in the previous example, the share-
holders recover nothing. 
 
Scenario 4  
Assumptions: (1) 90%/10% debt/equity, (2) limited liability, (3) super-priority & 
 (4) p = probability of success  
 Value in Success Value in Failure Expected Value 
Tort Victims 0 4000 – 4000 = 0 0 
Lender 9000 – 9000 = 0 6000 – 9000 = -3000 (1–p)(-3000) 
Equity 5000 – 1000 = 4000 0 – 1000 = -1000 (p)(4000) + (1–p)(-
1000) 
Total Social Value 4000 -4000 (p)(4000) + (1–p)(-
4000) 
Breakeven Probability: Socially-Optimal: 1-in-2 (50%) vs. Equity: 1-in-5 (20%) 
 
 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competi-
tion in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992) (same). 
 61. The idea for a statutory super-priority originated in a student note. See Painter, supra 
note 12, at 1080-81. A number of articles developed the idea in the 1980s and early 1990s, and its 
superiority to the status quo became a common view among bankruptcy scholars. See, e.g., Barry 
E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 
311, 340 (1993) (“Ideally, nonconsensual claimants would have highest priority in any sort of 
firm.”); Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 811, 826 (1994); Douglas G. 
Baird, Lessons from the Automobile Reorganizations, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 271, 275 (2012); Beb-
chuk & Fried, supra note 11;  Buckley, supra note 20, at 1417; Hanoch Dagan, Restitution in Bank-
ruptcy: Why All Involuntary Creditors Should Be Preferred, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 277 (2004); 
Heidt, supra note 21, at 839-41 (focusing on environmental claims); Leebron, supra note 22, at 
1569 (“[T]ort claimants should be given priority in bankruptcy proceedings.”); Lynn M. LoPucki, 
The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 61-63 (1996); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Credi-
tor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1891 (1994) (“[T]he appropriate remedy is to give involuntary 
creditors priority over secured creditors.”); Rasmussen, supra note 50, at 32-33; Mark J. Roe, Com-
mentary on “On the Nature of Bankruptcy”: Bankruptcy, Priority, and Economics, 75 VA. L. REV. 
219, 227 (1989) (“A rule of priority for nonbargain creditors seems efficient.”); Note, Switching 
Priorities: Elevating the Status of Tort Claims in Bankruptcy in Pursuit of Optimal Deterrence, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 2541, 2562 (2003). 
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The distinctive feature of this scenario is that the lender bears some 
of the business’s tort risk. On the simplifying assumptions we have made—
that the lender charges no interest and does not intervene in governance—
Acme’s shareholders are still able to externalize the risk, now onto the 
lender instead of the victims. But proponents of a super-priority for tort 
creditors reason that it would provoke a dynamic response from financial 
creditors. The lender would not offer the same loan terms in a world where 
it knows it might not recover as much as it would in a world in which it is 
protected from tort risk, as it is in the scenario posited above. 
Formerly high-priority creditors could be expected to respond in two 
ways: price and governance. Start with price. Because secured creditors 
face increased credit risk under a super-priority regime, they will charge 
more interest. In our hypothetical, the lender loses $3000 if the project 
fails. Suppose the lender believed the project had a fifty percent chance of 
success. It would need to make $3000—or charge 33% interest—in order 
to hold constant its expected nominal return of $0 (scenario 4a). Acme’s 
new interest expense in turn would drive down the profits available to 
shareholders if the project succeeds. Net of interest, the shareholders now 
would gain only $1000 in case of success. And, because they lose $1000 if 
the project fails, the lender’s adjustment to the rule change forces the 
shareholders to internalize their business’s tort risk. 
 
Scenario 4a  
Assumptions: (1) 90%/10% debt/equity, (2) risk-based debt pricing, (3) limited liability,  
(4) super-priority & (5) 50% probability of success  
 Value in Success Value in Failure Expected Value 
Tort Victims 0 4000 – 4000= 0 0 
Lender 12,000 – 9000 = 3000 6000 – 9000 = -3000 3000/2 + -3000/2 = 0 
Equity 2000 – 1000 = 1000 0 – 1000 = -1000 1000/2 + -1000/2 = 0 
Total Social Value 4000 -4000 4000/2 + -4000/2 = 0 
Breakeven Probability: Socially-Optimal: 1-in-2 (50%) vs. Equity: 1-in-2 (50%) 
 
Secured lenders would also presumably respond to a super-priority 
rule by intervening more aggressively in the borrower’s governance. In re-
ality, unlike our hypothetical, the risks to which a lender will be exposed 
after funding are uncertain and prone to moral hazard. Borrowers there-
fore minimize the interest they must pay by inviting lenders to monitor, 
and in some instances veto, corporate activity, and also by bonding against 
excessive risk taking.62 Under a super-priority norm, more of the costs of 
corporate torts would fall on financial creditors than they currently do. The 
 
 62. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 333-39 (1976). 
 
Claim Durability and Bankruptcy’s Tort Problem 
783 
optimal amount of monitoring and bonding, including the use of third-
party insurance policies, would increase. Risk-taking, in turn, would de-
crease.63 
Like the unlimited liability rule, a super-priority norm would solve 
bankruptcy’s tort problem only imperfectly. For one thing, it would not 
force managers and financial investors to internalize the expected costs of 
very large accidents. With limited liability in place, tort creditors could only 
ever recover up to the entire value of the tortfeasor’s assets. If the expected 
damages from a particular risk are very large relative to the value of a com-
pany’s assets, then a rule effectively assigning the company to tort victims 
would still undercompensate tort victims and fail to efficiently deter cor-
porate risk-taking. 
While a super-priority norm would increase tort claimants’ expected 
recoveries, it could also lead to complicated valuation disputes and might 
fail to provide adequate compensation for harms that have not fully mani-
fested at the time of the bankruptcy. Frequently the magnitude of a com-
pany’s tort and environmental liability is unknown when it files for bank-
ruptcy. In some cases, including recently in PG&E and Purdue, companies 
file in large measure because they want a bankruptcy judge to sort out lia-
bility. 
A super-priority rule might also provoke costly, strategic counter-
measures. Managers and financial creditors of a company that faces large 
but unmatured tort liability might seek to wind down or otherwise alter the 
business’s scope before bankruptcy, even if doing so were wasteful.64 There 
is evidence, for example, that firms facing significant cleanup costs seek to 
separate valuable assets from environmental obligations. In doing so, they 
increase the likelihood that whoever takes over the valuable assets is able 
to do so without also assuming onerous cleanup costs.65  
Despite its imperfection, we think that giving tort creditors a super-
priority claim would be superior to the status quo.66 The idea’s biggest 
downside is the same as that of unlimited liability: it does not seem to be 
on the legislative agenda. 
II. Implementing a Super-Durability Norm 
We propose to ameliorate bankruptcy’s tort problem by making tort 
claims durable to restructuring. More specifically, we encourage bank-
ruptcy judges to extend a debtor’s tort liability to the entity that holds the 
offending business’s assets after the resolution of the bankruptcy. Under 
 
 63. Leebron, supra note 22, at 1565. 
 64. For a discussion, see infra Section IV.A. 
 65. See Macey & Salovaara, supra note 13, at 882-919. Note, though, that a durability 
rule would not fully resolve this problem. Stronger fraudulent conveyance law is needed to reduce 
strategic pre-bankruptcy asset partitioning. See id. 
 66. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.  
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this approach, tort victims not paid in full or otherwise satisfied with their 
treatment in bankruptcy would be able to assert their claims outside it. 
We expect that a norm change along these lines would lead to better 
tort recoveries through Chapter 11 itself, as parties formulate plans in the 
shadow of each constituent’s outside option. Part III will discuss the pro-
posal’s economic implications. Here our aim is just to unpack the mecha-
nism by which bankruptcy judges could implement this proposal under cur-
rent law. To that end, we first describe the non-bankruptcy “durability” 
baseline and the Chapter 11 status quo. We then address the mechanics of 
judicial implementation. As we explain, there are at least two practical ver-
sions of a super-durability norm, corresponding to less and more aggressive 
norm change. 
A. Durability Doctrines Outside Bankruptcy 
According to black-letter law, tort victims have only latent interests 
in a tortfeasor’s assets. Like all unsecured creditors, their primary right is 
personal. It is a right that the debtor—and only the debtor—should pay its 
debts.67 After a creditor reduces her claim to judgment, the state will assist 
her in seizing assets from a recalcitrant debtor.68 But until then, her interest 
in the assets is fragile. It can be extinguished if the debtor transfers his 
property after becoming personally liable but before execution.69 In gen-
eral, an unsecured creditor can neither blame nor dispossess the transferee. 
This orthodox statement of the implication of in personam liability 
obscures as much as it reveals, however. Where they apply, three excep-
tional doctrines allow an unsecured creditor to follow a debtor’s property 
into a transferee’s hands. These doctrines in effect make the creditor’s in-
terest durable to transfer. For present purposes, we can bracket judgment 
liens70 and fraudulent transfer avoidance,71 while simply noting their broad 
application and practical importance to law’s remedial function. 
Successor liability is the durability doctrine most pertinent for think-
ing about how above-board restructuring transactions treat tort creditors. 
The presumptive rule of corporate succession holds that a buyer that 
 
 67. See generally Joseph Henry Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction in Rem to Compel 
Payment of a Debt, 27 HARV. L. REV. 107, 111 (1913) (providing a taxonomy of in rem and in 
personam rights). 
 68. See David Gray Carlson & Paul M. Shupack, Judicial Lien Priorities Under Article 
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Part 1, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 291-93 (1984). 
 69. This is not to say the unsecured creditor lacks any remedy during the interval. She 
may be able to attach assets to prevent their dissipation or get an injunction prohibiting transfer. 
 70. Every jurisdiction allows a judgment creditor to place a lien on at least some forms 
of debtor property. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 3201(a) (2018) (permitting judgment creditor to place a 
lien on the judgment debtor’s real property). 
 71. Unsecured creditors can recover property a debtor has transferred, or its value, to 
the extent the transferee gave the debtor less than “reasonably equivalent value” for it. See UNIF. 
VOIDABLE TRANSACTIONS ACT §§ 4(a)(2), 5(a), 7(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014). 
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purchases a company’s assets at fair value is not responsible for the seller’s 
debts.72 The debt belongs to the debtor. Successor liability defines the cir-
cumstances in which the presumption gives way.73 If the buyer voluntarily 
assumes the seller’s debts, then of course it is liable.74 Even absent volun-
tary assumption, the buyer can be held liable in most jurisdictions if a court 
finds that the buyer is a “mere continuation” of, or the result of a “de facto 
merger” with, the seller.75 
The prospect of successor liability is relatively strong where the pro-
ceeds of a financially distressed company’s sale yield tort creditors less than 
full recovery. This is not to say successor liability is ever a sure thing. The 
doctrine’s vague predicates are a case study in the indeterminacy of tran-
scendental nonsense.76 Nevertheless, there are stronger and weaker cases. 
Vague as it is, the doctrinal language suggests common fact patterns. The 
paradigmatic going-concern transactions are designed either to continue 
the business in a new legal shell (with a healthier balance sheet and perhaps 
new owners) or to roll it up into an existing operation. Moreover, there is 
evidence that judges disproportionately find successor liability when fail-
ing to do so would yield less than full recovery for tort or other involuntary 
creditors.77 
 
 72. The standard rule is that there is no liability for the buyer. E.g., Aguas Lenders Re-
covery Grp. v. Suez, 585 F.3d 696 (2d Cir. 2009); Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 352 F.3d 41 
(2d Cir. 2003). 
 73. For discussion of successor liability’s relationship to M&A activity, see Albert H. 
Choi, Successor Liability and Asymmetric Information, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 408 (2007); Rich-
ard L. Cupp, Jr., Redesigning Successor Liability, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 845; Michael D. Green, 
Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Products Liability Claimants, 
72 CORNELL L. REV. 17 (1986); John H. Matheson, Successor Liability, 96 MINN. L. REV. 371 
(2011); and Mark J. Roe, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Succes-
sor Corporation Liability, 70 VA. L. REV. 1559 (1984). 
 74. See Cargo Partner, 352 F.3d at 45.  
 75. See, e.g., David R. Kuney, Successor Liability in Sales of a Debtor’s Assets: The 
Problem of the "Mere Continuation" Exception, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 269, 270-71 & n.8 (1997) 
(“[U]nder existing law in most states, there is a serious risk that even bona fide, arm’s length sales 
of assets to existing owners will result in liability for the successor entity, even in the face of explicit 
documentation to the contrary.”). 
 76. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). 
 77. See Frank Fagan, From Policy Confusion to Doctrinal Clarity: Successor Liability 
from the Perspective of Big Data, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 391, 430 (2015) (analyzing factors that 
predict application of successor liability). There are good reasons for judges to focus the law this 
way. Absent successor liability, businesses expecting future tort judgments could sidestep liability 
by selling the business and paying the proceeds as a dividend to shareholders. Successor liability 
ensures that some pool of resources exists toward which tort claimants can look for satisfaction. 
See, e.g., Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 983–85 (1971) (“In 
tort cases, on the other hand, there is usually no element of voluntary dealing, and the question is 
whether it is reasonable for businessmen to transfer a risk of loss or injury to members of the 
general public through the device of conducting business in the name of a corporation that may 
be marginally financed.”); Roe, supra note 73, at 1562; cf. Bainbridge, supra note 57, at 513, 535 
(noting that veil-piercing is “rare, unprincipled, and arbitrary,” and stating that “[j]udicial opinions 
in this area tend to open with vague generalities and close with conclusory statements, with little 
or no concrete analysis in between”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 19, at 89 (“‘Piercing’ 
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A consequence is that acquisitions made under ordinary state-law 
processes reflect investors’ (probabilistic) expectations of tort liability. The 
more liability a buyer perceives to be associated with the seller’s business, 
the less he will pay for it. The discount might not be dollar-for-dollar, of 
course. Victims could opt to recover from the seller’s proceeds rather than 
from (or alongside) the buyer, or a court could decline to impose successor 
liability. The buyer is interested in what he expects to have to pay on ac-
count of the seller’s liabilities.78 But whatever the magnitude of the dis-
count, its directional effect is predictable. Successor liability means that 
buyers will pay less for companies with existing or anticipated tort obliga-
tions. 
B. Undoing Durability in Chapter 11 
Chapter 11, as it is practiced today, allows debtors and their senior 
creditors to cut off successor liability. 
Plans of reorganization. The conventional way to extinguish tort 
claims is through a plan of reorganization. When the Bankruptcy Code’s 
framers placed the plan construct at the center of corporate reorganization, 
they hoped doing so would produce flexibility, allowing dealmakers to tai-
lor a resolution to a debtor’s unique circumstances.79 In that spirit, the 
Code omits mandatory distributional norms. Any plan that meets minimal 
statutory requirements and garners supermajority support from every class 
of affected creditors can be confirmed.80 
Distributional norms enter the picture through rules governing con-
firmation absent unanimity. If an impaired class objects, the plan cannot 
be confirmed unless it honors familiar hierarchical distribution norms.81 In 
broad strokes these rules say that secured creditors must recover the full 
value of their collateral if the proposed plan would pay unsecured creditors 
anything; that certain classes of privileged unsecured creditors should be 
paid before unprivileged classes; that shareholders should recover nothing 
unless creditors are paid in full.82 Consensual plans thus take the shape they 
do, more or less producing hierarchical waterfall recoveries, with a view to 
 
seems to happen freakishly. Like lightning, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled. There is a consensus 
that the whole area of limited liability, and conversely of piercing the corporate veil, is among the 
most confusing in corporate law.”). 
 78. We invoke expectations here loosely. Risk-averse buyers of course care about vari-
ance as well as mean. For discussion of the effect of risk aversion on acquisition prices, see Choi, 
supra note 73; see also infra Section III.B.2.  
 79. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Three Ages of Bankruptcy, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 187, 192 
(2017). 
 80. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1129(a) (2018). One exception: any lone creditor can object to the 
extent it recovers less under the plan that it would in a liquidation scenario. Id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). 
 81. Id. § 1129(b). 
 82. Id. § 1129(b)(2). 
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creditors’ respective rights to object—with a view, that is, to objectors’ out-
side options. 
By default, confirmation of a plan extinguishes the ability of tort vic-
tims (and most other creditors) to recover outside the plan’s terms—which, 
because they have general unsecured claims, are not often generous. The 
Code accomplishes this result in two steps: discharge and asset-cleansing. 
The section dealing with plan confirmation declares that—“[e]xcept as oth-
erwise provided . . . in the plan, or in the order confirming the plan”—
confirmation “discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the 
date of such confirmation.”83 And it declares—again, “except as otherwise 
provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan”—that “property 
dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and interests of credi-
tors.”84 In short, tort creditors take only what the plan gives them. They 
may not sue the reorganized debtor or follow its assets into the hands of 
another entity that might acquire the business under the plan. 
Section 363 sales. An alternative way to extinguish tort claims is 
through an asset sale that receives the blessing of the bankruptcy judge. 
Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes debtors, “after notice and 
a hearing,” to “use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, property of the estate.”85 The provision was designed to allow a busi-
ness in the process of reorganizing (read: shrinking) to shed productive as-
sets, like equipment, it would no longer need, and to ensure the integrity 
of such a sale. Its language proved sufficiently broad, however, to justify a 
sea-change in Chapter 11 practice. In modern practice, section 363 is used 
to sell distressed businesses on a going-concern basis. Approximately one-
third of all large-corporate debtors who file for Chapter 11 do so in order 
to sell the business.86  
The most important, though not the only, reason managers of a dis-
tressed business might wish to sell in Chapter 11 is to cut off durability 
doctrines.87 Section 363, unlike ordinary principles of state law, allows a 
 
 83. Id. § 1141(d). 
 84. Id. § 1141(c). 
 85. Id. § 363(b). 
 86. Katherine Waldock, A Typology of U.S. Corporate Bankruptcy (Dec. 31, 2019) (un-
published manuscript), https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2020/preliminary/paper/ThzT9r5i 
[https://perma.cc/MM88-SCH6] (reporting the intentions of corporate filers, from 2004 to 2017, 
with at least $100 million in assets). Previous studies gauging the popularity of section 363 sales 
have estimated that anywhere from twenty percent to two-thirds of large-corporate cases result in 
a sale. See Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 
11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 520-21 (2009); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 
11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 675 (2003); Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bank-
ruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (2007); Stuart Gilson, Edith Hotchkiss & Matthew 
Osborn, Cashing Out: The Rise of M&A in Bankruptcy 39-40 tbl.1 (Mar. 6, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2547168 [https://perma.cc/232F-LJ5Y].  
 87. See Buccola, supra note 7, at 735-39. For an instructive discussion of bankruptcy law’s 
ability to wash otherwise tainted assets transferred in a going-concern sale, see Michael H. Reed, 
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debtor to sell property “free and clear of any interest in such property.”88 
The obvious application is to liens, which are traditionally described as “in-
terests in property.”89 With the court’s permission, a debtor can in effect 
solve a latent holdout dynamic among lienholders unlikely to recover in 
full on their claims. The Courts of Appeals most important for corporate 
bankruptcy practice have also, however, understood section 363 to permit 
sales that cut off successor liability.90 That reasoning is suspect. Successor 
liability is not founded on an interest in property but is rather a theory of 
personal liability—a reason why one person ought to answer for another’s 
wrongs.91 But in any case, section 363 has evolved such that it now offers 
distressed companies a relatively cheap avenue to cut off tort liability and 
limit tort creditors to whatever is left of sale proceeds after senior creditors 
have been repaid.  
In practice, section 363 sale orders routinely cut off the rights of tort 
creditors. Our analysis of section 363 sale orders issued by Delaware bank-
ruptcy judges between 2014 and 2019 turned up no cases carving out tort 
claims from the free-and-clear disposition. Selling assets free-and-clear is 
consistent with the dictum to “maximize the value of the estate.”92  
Two exceptions to Chapter 11’s tendency to undo durability are worth 
noting, both relating to liabilities “unknown” at the time of the bankruptcy. 
First, tort liabilities sufficiently remote at the time of disposition—whether 
by plan confirmation or sale—are not extinguished. The free-and-clear 
provisions work through the notion of a claim.93 The word claim is a term 
of art in the Bankruptcy Code, one defined to invoke a broad but not un-
limited notion of a “right to payment.”94 It includes even contingent rights. 
Yet in some instances where a debtor’s prepetition (unlawful) conduct 
 
Successor Liability and Bankruptcy Sales, 51 BUS. LAW. 653 (1996); and Michael H. Reed, Suc-
cessor Liability and Bankruptcy Sales Revisited—A New Paradigm, 61 BUS. LAW. 179 (2005). 
 88. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2018). 
 89. See, e.g., Lien, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
 90. Elliott v. General Motors LLC (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 829 F.3d 135, 155-56 
(2d Cir. 2016) (“[A] bankruptcy court may approve a § 363 sale “free and clear” of successor lia-
bility claims if those claims flow from the debtor's ownership of the sold assets.”); In re Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 288-90 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Ill. Dep’t of Revenue v. Hanmi 
Bank, 895 F.3d 465, 472-75 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that section 363 sale blocks tax collector’s 
statutory right to follow assets in bulk sale transaction); In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 123-26 
(2d Cir. 2009), vacated sub nom., Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 
(2010). 
 91. One can endorse the substantive rule while recognizing the statutory interpretation 
problem. The American Bankruptcy Institute’s commission on Chapter 11 reform, for example, 
took the position that Congress should clarify the rule to resolve doubt. Comm’n to Study the 
Reform of Chapter 11, supra note 7, at 141-45. 
 92. See, e.g., CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352 (1985). 
 93. The discharge provision works through the notion of “debt.” But a “debt” is just a 
liability on a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (2018). 
 94. A “claim” includes any “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to 
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, 
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” Id. § 101(5)(A). 
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manifests injury only after disposition, courts say that no claim accrued be-
fore disposition and, consequently, that a plaintiff can assert its case with-
out regard to the bankruptcy.95 Second, a claimholder who receives insuf-
ficient notice of bankruptcy proceedings is not bound by a discharge.96 
Publication notice can suffice for creditors of whom a debtor is unaware.97 
Many tort victims may fit that description. But if a debtor fails to give per-
sonal notice when it could have identified claimants and given personal 
notice with relatively little effort, their claims will not be extinguished.98  
The exceptions are, however, exceptional. As far as tort victims are 
concerned, the main tendency of Chapter 11 is to shorten the temporal 
horizon or recourse. 
C. Proposal: Redoing Durability 
We propose that bankruptcy judges should embrace successor liabil-
ity by preserving or even strengthening the norm that tort claims follow a 
business. 
The mechanism we have in mind is simple, although, as we will ex-
plain, it could be implemented in a couple of ways. The free-and-clear dis-
position of a debtor’s assets requires judicial buy-in. Section 363 sales are 
conditioned on judicial approval after “notice and a hearing.”99 Property 
dealt with in a plan of reorganization passes free and clear only if neither 
the plan nor the confirmation order says otherwise.100 These rules vest 
bankruptcy judges with enormous discretion, though the Code does not 
say how they should exercise that discretion.101 It does not enumerate, 
much less exhaust, the facts that a bankruptcy judge should consider when 
authorizing a free-and-clear sale. Our suggestion is that they consider, and 
 
 95. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991); see also, e.g., Epstein v. 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Piper Aircraft, Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(successor liability can be discharged if prepetition conduct created a relationship between debtor 
and future claimant and liability arose from prepetition operations); Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. 
v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159 (7th Cir. 1994) (no enjoining suit can be brought against the buyer of debtor 
assets free-and-clear); Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (no extinction of successor liability in section 363 sale where injury oc-
curred after sale and plaintiffs had no pre-sale relationship with debtor). 
 96. See, e.g., Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 346 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Inadequate 
notice is a defect which precludes discharge of a claim in bankruptcy.”). 
 97. Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988); Dahlin v. Lyondell 
Chem. Co., 881 F.3d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 98. The General Motors bankruptcy involved a prominent argument on this score. The 
Second Circuit held that Old GM had given insufficient notice to people harmed by its ignition-
switch defect, such that they could seek to establish successor liability against New GM. Elliott v. 
General Motors LLC (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 829 F.3d 135 (2d. Cir. 2016). 
 99. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2018). 
 100. Id. § 1141(c). 
 101. Cf. Baird, supra note 34, at 710-16 (characterizing reorganization law as essentially 
open-ended judicial power to ensure that those who control a reorganization treat all claimants 
fairly). 
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give weight to, a proposed sale or confirmation order’s treatment of tort 
claims. 
Before explaining our proposal, we should answer what might be a 
temperamental reaction. To lawyers accustomed to the status quo, our pro-
posal might sound outrageous, even unprecedented. Its very design aims 
to undermine lawful priorities, they might think, recalibrating debtors’ cap-
ital structures on an ad hoc basis and moving unsecured creditors to the 
front of the line. 
 In a sense the charge is accurate. The aim is to produce better out-
comes for tort creditors than they get under prevailing norms. And we do 
anticipate case-specific application of general principles. 
But that is as far as the criticism holds up. There is no generic priority 
scheme to summon for defense, no Platonic pecking order subsisting be-
yond the concrete rules and norms of the bankruptcy forum (subject to 
constitutional limitations, of course).102 The absolute priority rule—an im-
portant feature of Chapter 11, to be sure—says nothing about whom cred-
itors can sue beyond the confines of bankruptcy. It governs only the distri-
butions a contested plan or reorganization can make.103 Absolute priority 
and the hierarchy it presupposes are useful heuristics, but they no longer 
capture the variety of ways a debtor’s prepetition creditors share value, if 
they ever did. Critical vendor orders, debtor-in-possession loan roll-ups, 
gifting transactions, rights offerings, inducements to join a restructuring 
supporting agreement: these are just a few examples of practical innova-
tions nowhere sanctioned in the Bankruptcy Code, but nevertheless in 
wide use as a matter of discretion and deeply inconsistent with a stock no-
tion of priority.  
Existing law even features analogs that work at a systematic level by 
establishing a kind of successor liability. The Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) provides the 
most telling example.104 The Act establishes private obligations to remedi-
ate or pay for the remediation of sites contaminated by the disposal of haz-
ardous substances. It imposes joint and several liability on four categories 
of persons.105 For our purposes, CERCLA is interesting because it imposes 
 
 102. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-
Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235 (2013); see also, e.g., Skeel, supra 
note 41, at 713 (documenting “violations” of a supposed norm of pro rata treatment of creditors). 
 103. See Stephen J. Lubben, The Overstated Absolute Priority Rule, 21 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 581 (2016). The Justices did seem to have something like a Platonic hierarchy in 
mind in their most recent decision on the subject, Czyewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 
(2017). See Buccola, supra note 42, at 10-16. 
 104. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 
(2018)). For discussion of the relationship between bankruptcy law, Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), and related environmental statutes, 
see Light, supra note 9, at 191-200. 
 105. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2018). 
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liability not only on the persons who owned relevant facilities at the time 
hazardous materials were disposed106—a kind of strict liability—and on 
persons working for the owners in relation to disposal,107 but also on per-
sons who own a relevant facility when the CERCLA action is brought.108 
The effect is to establish a kind of successor liability. Whoever is holding 
the land at the time of recovery must pay. The Act makes bankruptcy ir-
relevant. It does not matter if the current owner acquired the contaminated 
facility free-and-clear of claims against the polluter, because, as in tradi-
tional successor liability, the Act establishes the owner’s liability directly—
not just derivatively—through the polluter. The owner can seek contribu-
tion from other responsible parties. But the owner is on the hook. That 
means acquirers, whether inside or outside of bankruptcy, must factor po-
tential liability into their valuations. 
Nor is successor liability limited to toxic waste sites. Other environ-
mental laws have adopted less onerous versions of successor liability. The 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, for example, establishes “cra-
dle-to-grave” liability for all parties involved in the generation, treatment, 
storage, and disposal of hazardous waste.109 The Surface Mining Coal Rec-
lamation Act requires that every coal mine operator post a bond to ensure 
that land used for coal mining be restored to its original state.110 These 
bonds follow the land, not the coal miner that originally incurred the 
cleanup obligation.111 
Successor liability also operates outside of the environmental context. 
For example, the Supreme Court has found that the National Labor Rela-
tions Act imposes liability on successors “beyond the confines of the com-
mon law rule when necessary to protect important employment-related 
policies.”112 For this reason, labor law creates a presumption of a “substan-
tial continuity” between a buyer’s and seller’s business with respect to the 
buyer’s obligations to the seller’s employees.113 This presumption is 
 
 106. Id. § 9607(a)(2). 
 107. Id. § 9607(a)(3), (4). 
 108. Id. § 9607(a)(1). 
 109. Id.; see also Learn the Basics of Hazardous Waste, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY 
(Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/hw/learn-basics-hazardous-waste#cradle 
[https://perma.cc/85NZ-XGBZ] (describing CERCLA and related environmental statutes). 
 110. See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 
Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (2018); and 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1211, 1231-1328 
(2018)).  
 111. See id. 
 112. Einhorn v. M.L. Ruberton Constr. Co., 632 F.3d 89, 94 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Golden 
State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 (1973)). In Golden State, the Court found an asset 
purchaser to be a successor when the purchaser had notice of labor dispute when the purchaser 
acquired the seller’s assets. Golden State, 414 U.S. at 182. See also John Wiley & Sons v. Living-
ston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964) (requiring a company to submit to arbitration with the union that repre-
sented employees of a predecessor company); NLRB v. Burns Int’l Sec. Svcs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972) 
(same). 
 113. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 43 (1987). 
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intended to ensure that collective bargaining agreements are not “subject 
to the vagaries of an enterprise’s transformation.”114 Employment law, too, 
often imposes successor liability and affords purchasers little flexibility to 
acquire assets free and clear of seller’s liability under federal employment 
law.115  
That a judicially managed super-durability norm would be unexcep-
tional in preferring one class of unsecured creditor over others (and even 
over secured creditors) does not, of course, prove that it’s a good idea. Per-
haps no such rule is justified. Perhaps some are and others not. Some 
thoughtful commentators object to special pleading generally.116 (We do, 
too, usually, unless it’s justified.) We will argue the merits in Part III. The 
point here is just to see that our innovation structurally resembles common 
practices. 
1. Preserving Successor Liability 
The less aggressive way to implement the super-durability strategy 
would preserve state-law principles of successor liability. This implemen-
tation would not affirmatively add durability to what background princi-
ples of state law would provide, but it would undo the practice in bank-
ruptcy of subverting those principles. The successful resolution of a 
Chapter 11 case, whether through a section 363 sale or a plan of reorgani-
zation, typically grants immunity to a transferee of assets who would oth-
erwise face liability as a successor-in-interest for claims of the transferor’s 
tort creditors. The gist is just to refuse to allow bankruptcy to wash tainted 
assets free and clear of successor liability when successor liability would 
otherwise attach. This is a relatively safe implementation, politically speak-
ing, because it requires little affirmative action by bankruptcy judges. How-
ever, because the reach of successor liability is uncertain and context-spe-
cific, its effect would accordingly be muted. 
The consequence of this limited intervention might be relatively 
small. They would depend on the importance of successor liability under 
state law. The downside of this method of implementation is that successor 
liability is an uncertain doctrine. It might not be applied by a subsequent 
state court or by a court in a different state. So it would work only 
 
 114. Id. at 38. 
 115. Einhorn, 632 F.3d at 93 (imposing successor liability for employment discrimination 
when the successor had notice, there was sufficient continuity of operations and workforce, and 
the seller failed to provide adequate relief); EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 945 (7th Cir.1988) 
(stating that, when the successor is aware of potential future liability, it will spend less to purchase 
the assets, and thus the seller that originally incurred liability will effectively bear the costs of 
liability); Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding successor liability 
for illegal employment practice on the ground that victim was unable to protect against change in 
business). 
 116. See generally Roe & Tung, supra note 102, at 1240-42 (arguing that attempts to alter 
priority rules leads to rent-seeking). 
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imperfectly. Still, we think this an improvement over the status quo, and 
one that could be achieved fairly easily. 
2. Assumptions of Liability 
A more aggressive approach would require that the reorganized 
debtor, or the buyer of the debtor’s assets in a section 363 sale, affirma-
tively assume liability for existing and future tort claims. In other words, 
the disposition of the debtor’s assets would establish successor liability 
without resort to uncertain, subsequent judicial implementation of the doc-
trine.  
The aggressive implementation would call to mind Chrysler in some 
respects. The bankruptcy judge’s performance in that case is a matter of 
intense controversy.117 We want to be clear how our idea compares. The 
Chrysler and GM bankruptcies were devices by which the United States 
and Canadian governments poured money into the auto manufacturing in-
dustry. Chrysler was especially controversial among bankruptcy scholars 
and practitioners because Judge Gonzalez signed off on a bidding process 
and sale—pushed by the Auto Task Force—featuring liability assumptions 
similar to what we propose. 
Here is how it worked.118 Chrysler had almost $7 billion in secured 
debt outstanding. It entered bankruptcy with a scheme hammered out in 
consultation with the Obama administration’s Auto Task Force. The plan 
was for a government-backed entity called New CarCo to acquire Chrys-
ler’s useful assets (and become integrated with Fiat, which held an equity 
stake in the acquirer). New CarCo made a stalking-horse bid to acquire 
Chrysler for $2 billion and to assume approximately $5 billion in unsecured 
obligations to retirees who were members of Chrysler’s chief labor union, 
the United Auto Workers (UAW). It is not unusual for a buyer to assume 
some of a debtor’s prepetition liabilities. But the magnitude of the assump-
tion in Chrysler was unlike any previous transaction.119 New CarCo also 
 
 117. For critical views, see, for example, Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Reorgani-
zation Law After Chrysler and General Motors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305 (2010); Ralph 
Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy of 
Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375; Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating 
Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 663 (2009); Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing 
the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727 (2010). For more sanguine evaluations, see, for 
example, Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 101, 109 (2009) (“In short, the basic structure used to reorganize both GM and Chrys-
ler was not unprecedented. Indeed, it was entirely ordinary.”); and Edward R. Morrison, Chrysler, 
GM, and the Future of Chapter 11, at 1 (Colum. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 365, 2010), 
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2418/ [https://perma.cc/YNK3-8AY7]; 
see also Baird, supra note 61, at 281 (objecting on principle to one ruling but arguing its practical 
irrelevance). 
 118. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 119. Roe & Chung, supra note 29, at 418-25 (comparing financial attributes of the Chrys-
ler sale to those of previous section 363 going-concern sales). 
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agreed not to seek modifications of the collective bargaining agreements 
and to give the union pension fund an equity stake in the business. Thus, 
under the terms of the bid, the retirees’ unsecured claims would be mostly 
or completely made whole, while the secured creditors would receive 29 
cents on the dollar.  
What was controversial as a matter of judicial policy, though, as op-
posed to the governments’ political policy, was not the bid. It was Judge 
Gonzalez’s acquiescence (later modified in part)120 in New CarCo’s pro-
posed bidding procedures. New CarCo proposed that any competing bids 
be required to assume the same liabilities and make the same commitment 
to honor existing labor contracts. This seemed designed to preclude bids 
that exceeded New CarCo’s $2 billion offer price, but that fell below its all-
in investment of $10 billion. Secured creditors were understandably un-
happy about the order, as were many bankruptcy scholars, who saw an ad 
hoc political intervention displacing the market-based norms of reorgani-
zation practice. As in our scheme, a bidder required to pay certain unse-
cured prepetition obligations can be expected to reduce its bid, which 
means less for the creditors whose recovery will come through the bank-
ruptcy. 
There are a few important points of contrast. Most importantly, the 
case for boosting tort creditors is stronger than the case for supporting the 
UAW in Chrysler. Tort creditors deserve a priority claim because they can-
not price insolvency risk. That is not necessarily true for a large labor un-
ion.121 The reason to protect the UAW in Chrysler, depending on who you 
were, had to do with sustaining labor peace (similar to a critical vendor 
order), sustaining an industry during a financial crisis, or winning votes. 
Second, the bidding procedures order in Chrysler was pushed by a lender 
and buyer who had social ambitions and were not simply trying to maxim-
ize return. Most cases presumably will not feature a DIP lender and stalk-
ing-horse bidder who demand that tort creditors be compensated in full. 
Third, the Chrysler intervention was designed to be anomalous. Some ob-
servers worried it would have a precedential effect.122 It seems not to have 
 
 120. David A. Skeel, Jr., From Chrysler and General Motors to Detroit, 24 WIDENER 
L.J. 121, 136 (2015) (“[T]he bankruptcy judge in Chrysler did insist on a slight modification of the 
bidding rules. But the final rule fell far short of creating a meaningful auction. It required only 
that the debtor take a look at any non-qualifying bid, and then decide—after consultation with the 
U.S. Treasury and Chrysler's unions (as well as the creditors' committee), precisely the parties 
most interested in the government’s arrangement—whether the non-qualifying bid should be con-
sidered.” (footnote omitted) (citing Chrysler, 405 B.R. at 93, 108-09 & n.25)). 
 121. To be clear, we take no particular view in this Article about how retiree obligations 
should rank. It’s just that the justifications for tort claims to rank first do not map comfortably to 
union-negotiated claims. Cf. Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting 
successor liability applies to section 1981 claims in part because employees are unable to protect 
against business sale). 
 122. See Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 117, at 1377 (“Although one might with consid-
erable justification argue that Chrysler and GM were sui generis—and as a matter of law should 
be politely and discreetly ignored as once-in-a-century aberrations having more to do with political 
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had one, though,123 probably because people recognized that the macroe-
conomic and political circumstances that led the administration to bail out 
the auto industry were unusual.124 
III. Assessing a Super-Durability Norm 
At first approximation, the consequences of a super-durability norm 
for tort claims would mimic those of a super-priority rule. In fact, with a 
few simplifying but in many cases useful assumptions, their effects would 
be identical. Both would force corporate managers and financiers to inter-
nalize the costs of strangers’ injuries ex ante, and would do so without im-
posing a social loss ex post. Under real world conditions, a comparison is 
arguable. A super-durability norm may avoid some of the pitfalls of a su-
per-priority rule, but would probably do so by exacerbating debt overhang 
problems.125 
This Part assesses the effect of a super-durability norm. For ease of 
exposition, we consider the strong version of our proposal. To develop in-
tuitions, we start with the world posited in Part I, where parties know the 
distribution of possible liabilities when financing decisions are made and 
know the extent of actual liability when restructuring becomes necessary. 
In this world, a super-durability norm performs exactly as a super-priority 
rule would. We then relax the model to consider scenarios where a debtor’s 
tort liability is uncertain at the time of restructuring, where potential inves-
tors are asymmetrically informed about the liability, and where the liability 
is likely to exceed (or amount to a large percentage of) the total value of 
the debtor’s assets. In these cases, our proposal could yield ex post ineffi-
ciencies that a statutory super-priority would not.126 We suspect that insti-
tutional responses would minimize the impact of these inefficiencies. But 
depending on one’s view, they could weigh in favor of a merely conditional 
or otherwise cautiously employed super-durability norm. 
 
and economic necessity than with legal precedent that anyone should take seriously—we suspect 
(indeed, to a virtual certainty) that such will not be the case.”); Roe & Skeel, supra note 117, at 
731 (“We can hope that the breach of proper practice will be confined to Chrysler. But the struc-
ture of the deal is not Chrysler-specific. Not only did the subsequent General Motors opinion rely 
heavily on Chrysler, but other courts and plan proponents will inevitably cite Chrysler as prece-
dent. Some already have.” (footnote omitted)).  
 123. Deniz Anginer & A. Joseph Warburton, The Chrysler Effect: The Impact of the 
Chrysler Bailout on Borrowing Costs (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5462, 2010), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228252869_The_Chrysler_Effect_The_Im-
pact_of_the_Chrysler_Bailout_on_Borrowing_Costs [https://perma.cc/M9K6-3UXL]. 
 124. Morrison, supra note 117, at 1. 
 125. In the corporate finance literature, debt overhang describes any situation in which 
the existence of outstanding debt blunts investment incentives. See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Beyond 
Insolvency, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2013) (discussing implications for law of recognizing solvency 
as a continuous rather than discrete variable). 
 126. Note, though, that many ex post inefficiencies are equally present in a super-priority 
world. 
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A. The Simple Case 
Where the amount of a debtor’s tort liability is known and the amount 
is less than the total value of the debtor’s assets, a super-durable claim 
would replicate the effects of a super-priority claim. In such a scenario, 
both rules allow tort victims to recover in full, at the expense of even senior 
financial creditors. Both rules therefore force lenders and borrowers to in-
ternalize the expected costs of tortious activity. 
To see how the two rules compare, return to the Acme hypothetical 
developed above. Specifically, recall our model of existing law applied to a 
project financed with secured debt and equity (scenario 2).127 The project 
costs $10,000 and yields an asset worth either $14,000 (success) or $10,000 
(failure), but in case of failure the business also generates $4000 of tort 
liability. If Acme were to finance the project with a 90/10 debt/equity ratio, 
the lenders would be made whole irrespective of the success or failure of 
the project, and tort creditors, should there be any, would be undercom-
pensated. The result was that Acme would be willing to finance the project 
if it had as little as a 1-in-5 chance of success, compared to the 1-in-2 chance 
that would make investment socially optimal. 
 
Scenario 2  
Assumptions: (1) 90%/10% debt/equity, (2) limited liability & (3) p = probability of success  
 Value in Success Value in Failure Expected Value 
Tort Victims 0 1000 – 4000 = -3000 (1–p)(-3000) 
Lender 9000 – 9000 = 0 9000 – 9000 = 0 0 
Equity 5000 – 1000 = 4000 0 – 1000 = -1000 (p)(4000) + (1–p)(-
1000) 
Total Social Value 4000 -4000 (p)(4000) + (1–p)(-
4000) 
Breakeven Probability: Socially-Optimal: 1-in-2 (50%) vs. Equity: 1-in-5 (20%) 
 
Consider, now, how the situation plays out under a super-durability 
norm. Unlike under a super-priority rule, the lender is entitled to be paid 
first from whatever the collateral realizes. The waterfall pays tort creditors 
only if there is value remaining after the lender is made whole. Now, how-
ever, the tort victims have a source of recovery outside the waterfall—
namely, against the business’s post-bankruptcy owner. The amount the 
post-bankruptcy financier is willing to pay for the business therefore de-
pends on the financier’s expectation of post-bankruptcy liability.128 Some 
 
 127. See supra Section I.A. 
 128. We are not the first to notice this dynamic. See, e.g., Zerand-Bernal Grp., Inc. v. 
Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) (“Zerand points out that the price received in a 
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simple algebra yields a unique solution. If the post-bankruptcy financier 
would pay $10,000 for the business “free and clear,” it pays only $6000 for 
the business subject to a super-durability rule. The lender is entitled to it 
all. This, after all, is what the bankruptcy estate receives and can distribute. 
The shareholders and tort victims get nothing from the bankruptcy. But 
because the bankruptcy yields them nothing, they can assert the entire 
$4000 of their claim against the post-bankruptcy business. The tort victims 
recover in full. 
 
Scenario 5129  
Assumptions: (1) 90%/10% debt/equity, (2) limited liability, (3) super-durability &  
(4) p = probability of success  
 Value in Success Value in Failure Expected Value 
Tort Victims 0 (0 – 4000) + 4000 = 0 0 
Lender 9000 – 9000 = 0 6000 – 9000 = -3000 (1–p)(-3000) 
Equity 5000 – 1000 = 4000 0 – 1000 = -1000 (p)(4000) + (1–p)(-
1000) 
Total Social Value 4000 -4000 (p)(4000) + (1–p)(-
4000) 
Breakeven Probability: Socially-Optimal: 1-in-2 (50%) vs. Equity: 1-in-5 (20%) 
 
Super-durability replicates the payouts under a super-priority rule. 
Both align Acme’s investment incentives with the socially optimal rule. 
B. Complications 
Under other, in some instances more realistic assumptions, a super-
durability norm could produce ex-post inefficiencies that prevailing norms 
do not (and that a statutory super-priority would not). Note, though, that 
whether super-durability would produce such inefficiencies in practice de-
pends on the efficacy of inter-creditor bargaining and the finesse with 
which bankruptcy judges manage their cases. These problems thus follow 
from the administrative costs of negotiating under uncertainty and from 
 
bankruptcy sale will be lower if a court is free to disregard a condition in the sale agreement en-
joining claims against the purchaser based on the sellers’ misconduct. If the condition is invalid 
the purchaser will be buying a pig in a poke, never knowing when its seller’s customers may come 
out of the woodwork and bring suit against it under some theory of successor liability. This possi-
bility will depress the price of the bankrupt’s assets, to the prejudice of creditors.”); David Gray 
Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of Intertemporal Creditor Pri-
orities Created by Running Covenants, Products Liability, and Toxic-Waste Cleanup, 50 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 120 (1987) (“A solvent buyer of . . . encumbered property will discount 
the purchase price by the amount of the expected inherited personal liability, and to this extent, 
the recovery of present creditors will be diminished in bankruptcy . . . .”). 
 129. The differences between scenarios 4 and 4a also apply to scenario 5. 
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facilitating coordination among tort claimants—not because debt over-
hang is a problem in and of itself.130 Below we explain why we expect par-
ties to manage these ex post inefficiencies contractually. Here we outline 
potential downsides of a super-durability norm. 
1. Claim Value Uncertainty (Symmetric Information) 
The precise amount of a debtor’s tort liability is likely to be known at 
the time of a bankruptcy filing only in cases involving relatively small com-
panies. For smaller businesses, an adverse judgment may be the cause of 
Chapter 11. Many debtors, including larger companies for whom tort lia-
bility is a factor in the decision to use bankruptcy, will by contrast face pre-
dominantly unliquidated claims. A dark cloud hangs over the business, but 
no one is quite sure how much it will rain. 
For purposes of modeling investor reactions, an assumption of cer-
tainty can be useful even in cases involving doubt. Experienced lawyers 
and litigation financiers can produce reasonably accurate liability esti-
mates if relevant conduct and the number and demographic circumstances 
of the claimants can be established. 
In other cases, however, the standard error of even the best estimates 
is too large. Uncertainty might derive from a lag between culpable behav-
ior and manifest injury. Parties might know about a debtor’s culpable con-
duct, but not the conduct’s reach or the harms it will eventually cause. The 
asbestos cases provide the most salient, but hardly the only example. Some 
pharmaceutical liability has a similar structure.131 Uncertainty might alter-
natively derive from ignorance about the existence or nature of culpable 
conduct. Parties might not know, for example, that a debtor’s cars have 
been engineered to falsify carbon admissions.132 
Where the amount of a debtor’s tort liability is highly uncertain, and 
where the potential post-bankruptcy financiers are risk-averse, a super-du-
rability norm may produce ex-post inefficiency that a super-priority rule 
would not. Reckonings have value. In the presence of uncertainty, risk-
averse financiers will discount their bids. Moreover, as uncertainty in-
creases, so too does the chance that the highest bid represents not the best 
 
 130. Ken Ayotte and David Skeel have made a related point in connecting debt over-
hang to coordination challenges. See Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel Jr., Bankruptcy Law as a 
Liquidity Provider, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1557, 1573 (2013) (“[T]he debt-overhang problem, like the 
common-pool problem, is fundamentally a problem of coordinating multiple creditors.”). 
 131. See Nate Raymond, Indivior to Pay $600 Million to Settle U.S. Opioid Treatment 
Marketing Claims, REUTERS (Jul. 24, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-indivior-set-
tlement/indivior-to-pay-600-million-to-settle-u-s-opioid-treatment-marketing-claims-
idUSKCN24P1W5 [https://perma.cc/5K8H-HXMS].  
 132. See Guilbert Gats, Jack Ewing, Karl Russell & Derek Watkins, How Volkswagen’s 
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use of the debtor’s assets, but merely the owners least sensitive to uncer-
tainty. A super-durability norm is not designed to produce certainty.133 Pre-
vailing bankruptcy norms are. Free-and-clear sales give the buyer cer-
tainty—not perfect certainty, given the doctrine,134 but a good measure. 
Proceeds are paid out under a strict waterfall, especially if the case is con-
verted to Chapter 7, or else under agreed terms. Free-and-clear plans allo-
cate cash and ownership interests in the reorganized company according to 
a negotiated settlement or, if need be, judicial estimation.135 Not so with a 
super-durability norm. If tort claims are durable, and if tort creditors insist 
on durability rather than an alternative proposed recovery through the 
bankruptcy process, then neither a sale nor a plan can fully resolve uncer-
tainty. 
Note, though, that certainty for financial creditors under a super-pri-
ority regime does not mean that super-priority is clearly preferable to su-
per-durability. When future tort liability is uncertain, tort claimants will 
recover based on an estimate of the value of their claims. Bankruptcy 
judges cannot know the precise value of tort claims that will only manifest 
years in the future. Under a super-priority rule, bankruptcy judges will set 
aside funds to pay the tort claimants based on an estimate of the damages 
tort victims will suffer in the future.136 There is therefore a tradeoff be-
tween a super-priority rule and a super-durability rule. In settling all the 
debtor’s affairs in the bankruptcy proceeding, the super-priority rule gives 
financiers certainty about the extent of tort liability they will be exposed to 
in the future. In doing so, a super-priority rule increases the likelihood that 
assets will continue to be put to productive use.  
Certainty for financial creditors, however, comes at the expense of 
certainty for tort creditors, whose claims might be able to be valued with 
precision if they are brought when the harm occurs but not when their 
 
 133. Though, as we explain presently, a super-durability norm could facilitate negotia-
tion between tort claimants and other stakeholders. In such cases, a super-durability norm would 
not lead to increased uncertainty. 
 134. See supra Section II.C. 
 135. See, e.g., Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Piper Aircraft, 
Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995); Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 
B.R. 243 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that known tort claims are paid by the seller—not the 
buyer—in a section 363 sale, but that the buyer remains liable to future tort victims who had not 
yet been injured at the time of the sale).  
 136. Asbestos litigation led to a number of these trusts, and difficulties assessing the 
magnitude of harms caused by asbestos exposure left many of these trusts underfunded and left 
future claimants uncertain about their ability to recover. See Mark D. Plevin, Leslie A. Epley & 
Clifton S. Elgarten, The Future Claims Representative in Prepackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: 
Conflicts of Interest, Strange Alliances, and Unfamiliar Duties for Burdened Bankruptcy Courts, 
62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 271, 277 (2006) (summarizing this phenomenon in the context of 
the Johns-Manville asbestos trust); Stephen Labaton, The Bitter Fight over the Manville Trust, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/08/business/the-bitter-fight-over-the-
manville-trust.html [https://perma.cc/LXH3-NMRD] (stating that the Manville Trust was 
“looted” just two years after it was created); see also RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN 
A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 75 (2007) (“The Manville trust proved to be a perilous institution . . . 
with large numbers of claims quickly overwhelming its initial capitalization.”). 
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claims must be settled prospectively. Neither rule is perfect, and the supe-
riority of one regime may depend on one’s views about whether it is pref-
erable to allow financiers to extend credit without being exposed to future 
tort liability, or whether it is preferable to give tort claimants an oppor-
tunity to collect based on the harms they actually suffer—not the harms 
they expect to suffer in the future.  
Moreover, the extent of ex-post inefficiency that would result from a 
super-durability norm depends on the ability of parties to negotiate among 
themselves. As we discuss in more detail below, judicial finesse and bar-
gaining among creditor representatives are key to the ex post efficiency of 
a super-durability norm in the presence of uncertainty. If a debtor’s inves-
tors—understood broadly to include both financial creditors and involun-
tary claimants—can realize a surplus from including a free-and-clear pro-
vision, then there is at least a notional (Coasean) deal to be struck. 
Especially in smaller cases, that ought to work fine. A universally agreed 
deal might be less likely to emerge in mass tort cases with hundreds or 
thousands of tort claimants, especially if they lack aggregate representa-
tion, or if there are multiple, differentially situated classes of tort claimants. 
We see a role for judicial discretion to encourage surplus-yielding deals. 
2. Claim Value Uncertainty (Asymmetric Information) 
A more pointed complication arises where parties are asymmetrically 
informed about the amount of a debtor’s uncertain tort liability. Outsiders 
who might finance a business post-bankruptcy worry about a form of ad-
verse selection.137 If tort claims can be asserted against the post-bankruptcy 
business, then the value of that business is a function of the amount of the 
liability.138 And if outsiders think that insiders have both superior infor-
mation and the capacity themselves to become post-bankruptcy financiers, 
then outsiders will reduce their bids, relative to what they would bid if in-
formation were symmetric, so as not to become cursed winners.139 The in-
tuition is straightforward: why would insiders allow a bid to win unless they 
believe it underestimates the magnitude of liability? In equilibrium, infor-
mation asymmetry tends to lock incumbents in place and depress investors’ 
 
 137. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset 
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 277 (1984) (describing adverse selection in the context of acquisition 
agreements and arguing that the seller is the most efficient information provider).  
 138. The value also depends, of course, on the cash flows the assets are expected to pro-
duce. Insiders can have private information about either variable; we just happen to be focused 
on tort liability rules. For discussion of asymmetric information about the value of debtors’ assets, 
see Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 130, at 1579-85. 
 139. Cf. Choi, supra note 73, at 418-26 (modeling this dynamic in the M&A rather than 
bankruptcy setting). 
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recoveries.140 Dynamically, the expectation of asymmetric information will 
tend to increase the cost of capital in industries most likely to generate 
opaque tort liabilities. 
But the problem of asymmetric information is endemic in all bank-
ruptcies and not unique to tort claimants.141 Managers simply know more 
than an arm’s-length financier about every facet of operations that cannot 
be, or in any case is not, quantified. That can be true about the size of con-
tingent or unmatured tort liabilities, the likelihood that a product will turn 
out to be defective, and the firm’s production costs and operating expenses.  
Still, there is reason to think that asymmetric information is especially 
problematic in the context of tort claims. Insiders are more likely to know 
if the company has dumped toxic chemicals—and if so, where and how 
much—or if its products have proved faulty or dangerous in some circum-
stances, or if allegations of harassment made to Human Resources consti-
tute a pattern or practice, and so on. Disparities in information will loom 
larger in some cases than others. 
One should not overstate the role that asymmetric information about 
tort liability is likely play in the ordinary case, however. To repeat what we 
have said already, in a significant fraction of cases, especially those involv-
ing smaller businesses, the extent of tort liability will be common 
knowledge. In cases where the amount of liability is highly uncertain, the 
people with relevant knowledge may not be potential post-bankruptcy fi-
nanciers. A prospective, outsider financier will mainly be concerned about 
the information base of banks and investment funds with longstanding re-
lationships to the debtor. But how likely are they to know much more than 
an outsider about, say, the cause of wildfires in Northern California, or the 
extent of junior employees’ bid rigging or bribery? The answer, of course, 
is that it depends. 
In any event, the prevailing free-and-clear norm unwinds adverse-se-
lection dynamics to a large extent.142 It does so not by equalizing access to 
information, but by making information about expected tort liability irrel-
evant. The amount of prepetition tort liability matters to the value of the 
post-bankruptcy business only if tort creditors can assert claims against it. 
That is what a free-and-clear norm says is off the table. 
A super-durability norm, by contrast, exacerbates the information-
asymmetry problems that already exist in bankruptcy. Just as one might 
expect incumbent management to be well-informed about the value of the 
assets it is selling, so too would one expect managers to have a more accu-
rate sense of future tort liability than prospective buyers. In this way, a 
 
 140. Id. For a general model of common-value auction dynamics with asymmetric infor-
mation, see Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, Competitive 
Bidding and Private Information, 11 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 161 (1983). 
 141. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 130, at 1579-81. 
 142. For an analogous mechanism, see id. at 1594. 
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durability norm creates an additional reason for buyers and financiers to 
worry that sellers are refusing to disclose information that is relevant to the 
purchase price. 
But again, there are compelling reasons to think that institutional re-
sponses will mitigate—or even eliminate—the moral hazard problem gen-
erated by information asymmetries. Information asymmetry is not unique 
to bankruptcy. It is also one of the principal challenges in ordinary mergers 
and acquisitions.143 Yet parties have developed a contractual solution to 
the issue. Representations and warranties—often referred to as “reps”—
are contractual promises about the veracity of a fact that is relevant to an 
asset sale.144 According to Stuart Gilson, the “primary purpose” of the rep-
resentations and warranties sections of acquisition agreements is “to rem-
edy conditions of asymmetrical information in the least cost manner.”145 
Reps offer an elegant solution to the information asymmetry problem, be-
cause they encourage the party that has information relevant to an asset’s 
price to disclose that information. Buyers use reps to protect themselves 
against all sorts of claims, from sexual harassment to labor liability to false 
or misleading information regarding the seller’s assets and liabilities.146  
It is in the interest of both buyers and sellers for sellers to make their 
private information available to prospective buyers. A buyer that fears that 
a seller has information that would depress the buyer’s evaluation of the 
value of the business will pay less—or perhaps not even submit a bid in the 
first place—in response to the possibility that the buyer is hiding negative 
information. The disclosure thus reduces uncertainty and eliminates the 
transaction costs the seller incurs trying to acquire information relevant to 
its offer price.147  
Unlike ordinary mergers and acquisitions, an insolvent firm is unlikely 
to be able to use reps to resolve the information asymmetry problem. An 
insolvent seller will distribute the proceeds of a sale and wind up its busi-
ness. The buyer cannot indemnify the seller against false representations 
for the simple reason that the buyer lacks the resources to do so. A seller 
will therefore find scant assurance from a contractual provision in which 
the seller agrees to cover any future liabilities that result from the seller’s 
 
 143. See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The 
Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 856 (“The challenge of contract design is 
largely the management of information problems.”). 
 144. Technically, a representation does not give rise to liability unless a party justifiably 
relied on the representation whereas warranties are provisions of the contract that give rise to 
liability regardless of whether or not there was justifiable reliance. See CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis 
Publ’g, Co., 553 N.E.2d 997 (N.Y. 1990). 
 145. See Gilson, supra note 137, at 269. 
 146. See Sean J. Griffith, Deal Insurance: Representation and Warranty Insurance in 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1839, 1840-41 (2020). 
 147. For extended discussion of this phenomenon, see Gilson, supra note 137, at 268-74. 
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behavior if the seller ceases to exist or lacks the funds to honor that com-
mitment. 
It is not clear, however, why insurance would fail to mitigate this issue. 
Sean Griffith has recently documented the rapid growth of representation 
and warranty insurance (RWI) in private M&A deals.148 Though this form 
of insurance was extremely rare just a decade ago, today at least twenty 
insurers offer RWI, with coverage extending as high as $1 billion.149 As a 
practical matter, then, it seems that there is a market for insurance against 
future tort liability—at least in the context of M&A, where buyers bear 
some risk of being held liable for the activities of the seller. 
Under current bankruptcy law, there is no reason for an insurance 
company to offer protection against an insolvent debtor’s tort liability. Be-
cause bankruptcy allows buyers and sellers to externalize the costs of tort 
liability onto victims by selling assets free and clear of encumbrances, nei-
ther buyers nor sellers in a bankruptcy proceeding will expect to bear the 
costs of sellers’ tortious conduct. The ability to use bankruptcy to shed tort 
liability thus ensures that there is no demand for insurance against claims 
that stemmed from a bankrupt debtor’s tortious conduct. 
However, if bankruptcy judges developed a durability norm in which 
a seller’s tort liability passed on to the buyer, they would thereby create a 
market for insurance that would protect buyers from liability for sellers’ 
tortious conduct. A leveraged company might purchase insurance in order 
to reassure prospective buyers about their potential exposure to future li-
ability.150 Alternatively, the acquirer would purchase insurance for the deal 
itself. Either way, the insiders would bear the cost of the asymmetry, be-
cause it will result in a discount to what the outsiders will pay. Given the 
robust market for insurance in M&A deals, there is reason to think that 
such a market would emerge in bankruptcy if buyers were held liable for 
the debtors’ tortious conduct. 
Insurance would, moreover, encourage distressed firms to continue to 
monitor their activities and limit their tortious conduct. Michael Ohlrogge 
recently found that distressed firms are seven times more likely to engage 
in Clean Water Act violations, and that the prospect of successor liability 
has a substantial deterrent effect.151 The implication is that distressed firms 
have little reason to comply with environmental laws when they can expect 
to socialize those costs in bankruptcy, but that successor liability encour-
ages distressed firms to comply with environmental laws because doing so 
 
 148. See Griffith, supra note 146, at 1843 (finding that RWI was used in thirty to fifty 
percent of deals in which neither party is publicly traded). 
 149. See id. 
 150. Painter, supra note 12, at 1076 (“In general, if a firm’s voluntary creditors are threat-
ened by tort claims, they will have an incentive to monitor the manufacturer’s potentially tortious 
behavior and to force the manufacturer to purchase adequate insurance.”). 
 151. See Ohlrogge, supra note 45. 
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helps to reassure prospective buyers that the sellers’ assets are saddled with 
environmental obligations. Insurers, too, could be expected to investigate 
a firm’s exposure to tort liability and charge lower premiums when it ap-
pears that a firm has little exposure to tort liability.152 To the extent that 
insurance would cover tort liability, it would go a long way towards resolv-
ing the information asymmetry problem. 
3. Liabilities Exceed Value of Business 
A third important complication involves what we call hot potato as-
sets. This problem arises when the amount of a debtor’s tort liability 
equals, or even exceeds, the value of the cash flows the debtor’s assets can 
be expected to generate. This is a type of debt overhang problem.153 In ex-
treme circumstances, the debt overhang problem might cause potentially 
productive assets to go unused. No one wants to acquire an asset that 
comes with liability that is equal to or greater than the value of the asset. 
It is plausible, though, that even these extreme cases would not idle pro-
ductive assets. It would be rational for tort claimants to either accept pay-
ment in exchange for waiving their claims against the successor entity, or 
themselves to take equity in the successor entity. Durability would thus 
facilitate bargaining between tort claimants and other creditors. And in 
less extreme cases, debt overhang may cause an owner to underinvest in 
complementary resources.154  
In theory, though, debt overhang could pose genuine challenges to the 
development of a super-durability norm. The ceiling on potential liability 
in mass tort is almost unlimited. Think of asbestos, tobacco, or opioids. The 
fact that a given line of business has proved to generate large liabilities also 
diminishes asset values. Certain environmentally degraded parcels of land 
arguably exhibit hot potato qualities.155 There are statutes imposing 
cleanup liability on owners.156 These operate like successor liability rules. 
Some plots are not worth owning at any price, because the statutory liabil-
ity will doubtless exceed the value of correlative cash flows. Imagine, for 
example, that a bankruptcy judge insisted that the firm that purchased the 
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Weinstein Company’s film rights compensate the victims of Harvey Wein-
stein’s sexual assault in full, and that the prospect of doing so deterred all 
prospective buyers from purchasing the company’s film rights. In such cir-
cumstances, the durability norm would harm all parties. The movie rights 
are, presumably, worth something. All claimants—including tort claim-
ants—would prefer to realize that value and not have the specter of future 
liability block an asset sale that would have allowed them at least a partial 
recovery. 
Indeed, debt overhang is one of the central problems toward which 
bankruptcy is addressed.157 The free-and-clear norm avoids the hot potato 
problem. Since the free-and-clear norm allows buyers to shield themselves 
from the bankrupt debtor’s tort liability, it eliminates debt overhang and, 
in doing so, avoids the hot potato problem.158  
There are, however, reasons to think that a durability norm would not 
create a hot potato problem. Debt overhang is a problem in only a subset 
of the situations in which it prevents assets from being put to productive 
use. Outstanding debts may block asset transfers for a number of reasons, 
only some of which are inefficient. When the social costs of using an asset 
exceed its expected future cash flows, the asset should not be considered 
an asset. It should be considered a liability. If the only way for an asset to 
generate value is for owners to shed liabilities that unavoidably accompany 
the use of the asset, then the asset has a negative social value, and it should 
be abandoned. Environmental liabilities can sometimes be understood in 
this way. If, for example, the costs of reclaiming a coal mine exceeds the 
expected future cash flows that the coal mine can be expected to generate, 
then the coal mine imposes costs that exceed the market value of the coal 
the mine could produce. Regulations are designed to force firms to inter-
nalize some of the social costs associated with an activity. If bankruptcy 
allows firms to extricate themselves from these regulatory costs, and if do-
ing so is the only reason that an asset retains a positive value, then the 
problem is that bankruptcy allows entities to continue to make a profit off 
of goods even when the costs of using those goods exceed their value.159 
Other liabilities, however, are not intrinsic to an asset. A durability 
norm that prevents asset transfers might be inefficient in these situations. 
There is reason, for example, to think that the Weinstein Company’s film 
rights are valuable despite Harvey Weinstein’s alleged sexual assault. The 
fact that Harvey Weinstein’s actions generated massive tort liabilities does 
not mean that his film rights have a negative value. It would harm tort 
claimants if successor liability prevented would-be buyers from purchasing 
the Weinstein Company’s film rights. Tort claimants can be expected to 
 
 157. See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 130, at 1570-72. 
 158. See id. at 1592-94. 
 159. For an extended analysis of this issue, see Macey & Salovaara, supra note 13, at 932-
41. 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:766 2021 
806 
recover something from an asset sale, but they would recover nothing if 
the prospect of successor liability prevented the company’s films from be-
ing put to productive use. It is in these circumstances that a super-durabil-
ity norm generates a debt overhang problem. 
It is not clear, however, that the debt overhang problem would be a 
problem in practice. Concern about debt overhang is based on the view 
that administrative costs would prevent tort claimants and potential buyers 
from reaching a mutually beneficial agreement. In addition to the possibil-
ity, discussed above, that firms would purchase insurance to protect them-
selves from precisely this type of situation, there is also reason to think that 
tort victims would not block asset sales when doing so would bar them from 
recovery. Bankruptcy judges routinely appoint a future claimants repre-
sentative (FCR) to advocate on behalf of parties whose claims have not yet 
matured and who therefore are unable to participate in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. When bankruptcy judges expect future claims to be significant, 
they often create a trust to pay these claimants and issue a channeling in-
junction that channels claims away from the debtor and into the trust. The 
channeling injunction prevents future claimants from asserting claims 
against anyone other than the trust that was established to pay future 
claimants.160  
Though bankruptcy judges now have statutory authority to appoint 
an FCR and issue a channeling injunction,161 these devices originated not 
from Congress, but from bankruptcy judges who felt that they needed to 
protect future asbestos claimants who could not represent themselves in 
the asbestos bankruptcies.162 While it is difficult to calculate the size of fu-
ture liabilities with precision, these trusts have allowed assets to be put to 
productive use while ensuring that tort claimants are able to bring what 
might otherwise have been foreclosed by the debtor’s decision to file for 
bankruptcy protection.163 
Super-durability, if applied blindly, has downside in mass liability sit-
uations. But tort victims would only harm themselves if they prevented 
themselves from recovery by blocking asset sales. When a company’s tort 
liability threatens to block an asset sale, tort claimants can be expected to 
bargain in the shadow of the law. While coordination or holdup problems 
might deter prospective buyers that do not want to negotiate directly with 
potentially thousands of tort claimants, current law gives bankruptcy 
judges authority to mitigate these challenges. By appointing a future claim-
ants’ representative to negotiate on behalf of tort claimants, bankruptcy 
judges could appoint a representative who would have a legal obligation to 
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negotiate in good faith on behalf of tort victims. When debt overhang 
threatened to block an asset sale, the FCR would likely accept a payment 
from a would-be buyer and agree to forfeit claims against the reorganized 
firm. The alternative would be to prevent tort claimants from receiving any 
compensation. In fact, courts have held that the FCR must be impartial 
and diligently represent the interests of future claimants.164 It would likely 
be a violation of this duty if the representative’s refusal to settle impeded 
an asset transfer that would have allowed future claimants to receive some 
compensation.  
Thus, when there is a significant debt overhang, it is reasonable to ex-
pect a super-durability norm to precisely mimic the effect of a super-prior-
ity rule. A durability norm theoretically would give tort claimants a right 
to collect from the entity that emerges from bankruptcy (or that acquires 
the bankrupt’s assets in a 363 sale). Instead of blocking an asset sale, a du-
rability norm might instead facilitate bargaining between tort claimants 
and prospective buyers. 
C. Institutional Responses 
The previous section explained how uncertainty, asymmetric infor-
mation, and debt overhang pose challenges for our super-durability pro-
posal. It also argued that there are reasons to think that these concerns are 
overstated. The existence of insurance in ordinary asset sales suggests that 
insurance companies would offer to protect buyers from a bankrupt 
debtor’s tort liability. Moreover, even when tort claims threaten to block 
an asset transfer, tort victims can be expected either to take over the bank-
rupt firm’s assets themselves, or to authorize a free and clear sale to max-
imize their own recovery. There is, however, one additional reason to think 
that corporations will be able to manage a super-durability bankruptcy 
norm: when buyers have been held liable for the debts of their bankrupt 
predecessors, they have managed those risks successfully. 
1. Insurance 
There is reason to think that insurance companies will provide cover-
age against an insolvent debtor’s tort liability to companies that purchase 
assets from a bankruptcy estate. There are exceptions to the general rule 
that a bankruptcy estate should emerge free and clear of debts and encum-
brances. In some situations, those exceptions are significant. The obliga-
tion to reclaim land degraded by coal mining, for example, remains with 
whatever company acquires the coal mine.165 The coal mining industry is 
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currently in significant distress. At least sixty percent of coal is mined by 
companies that have filed for bankruptcy protection in the past five 
years.166 Nonetheless, more than $10 billion of coal reclamation obligations 
is guaranteed by third-party insurers.167 Those insurers have agreed to re-
claim coal mines in the event that the coal mine operators—most of whom 
purchased the mines in the recent wave of coal bankruptcies—are unable 
to do so.168  
Nor is coal mining unique. As discussed above, many environmental 
obligations—and not simply coal cleanup obligations—stay with the land 
and therefore pass on to the entity that purchases land with which environ-
mental obligations are associated. A robust market for CERCLA insur-
ance has emerged to protect toxic polluters from CERCLA liability, and 
today, a majority of CERCLA claims involve disputes about how to allo-
cate costs among different insurance providers.169 Similarly, not all tort 
claims are wiped out in bankruptcy. Tort claims that were unknown at the 
time of the bankruptcy can often be brought against the reorganized firm. 
The rapid development of RWI, in addition to the existence of insurance 
that protects specifically against successor liability claims, again implies 
that markets will devise ways to put socially valuable assets to productive 
use, even if firms could not shed tort liabilities incurred by the bankrupt 
debtor.170 Insurance, it seems, is capable of managing the potential costs of 
a durability norm. 
2. Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law 
There is also reason to think that the prospect of sizeable successor 
liability would facilitate—not impede—bargaining among parties to the 
bankruptcy proceeding. In the wave of coal mining company bankruptcies 
that swept across the country between 2015 and 2017, state environmental 
regulators were legally entitled to insist that companies fully reclaim coal 
mines.171 There was a plausible argument that the liability was non-dis-
chargeable. The problem, however, was that bankrupt coal firms seemed 
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unable to honor their cleanup obligations.172 Environmental claimants 
were thus in a position to prevent coal companies from reorganizing. In 
doing so, however, environmental regulators would have hurt themselves, 
because the expected distribution would not have covered the costs of rec-
lamation.173 But instead of blocking coal mining companies from selling 
their assets, environmental regulators instead agreed to accept a super-pri-
ority claim on some of the bankrupt coal mining company’s assets.174 These 
agreements ensured that coal mining companies were able to emerge from 
bankruptcy and thus increased the likelihood that land used for coal min-
ing would be reclaimed.175 
In fact, when tort claimants are in a position to block bankruptcy sales, 
they seem to prefer to accept a reduced payment. In recent opioid bank-
ruptcies, pharmaceutical companies’ tort liability dwarfed other claims.176 
It would have been impossible for tort victims to insist that they be made 
whole. They therefore accepted a settlement and agreed to waive future 
opioid-related claims.177 Again, there is little evidence that tort claimants 
will block an asset sale when doing so is harmful to their own interests. It 
instead appears that strong tort claims simply allow tort claimants to get a 
seat at the bankruptcy table and negotiate to receive some of the proceeds 
of the reorganization or asset sale. 
D. Summary 
A super-durability norm would improve on the status quo in many, if 
not all, circumstances. In situations where the magnitude of a debtor’s tort 
liabilities is relatively certain and not so large as to preclude a post-bank-
ruptcy financier’s making complementary investments, super-durability 
mimics a super-priority rule. It produces better ex-ante incentives than the 
status quo rule does without sacrificing realized value ex post. 
The calculus is more complicated in cases where tort liabilities are 
highly uncertain and debt overhang is a worry. It would of course be a 
strike against super-durability if the norm were apt to interfere with the 
imperative that productive resources be put to their best use. Skeptics 
might worry that durability could impede high-value asset sales and reor-
ganizations. After all, if new owners believe they will be buried under a 
mountain of tort debt irrespective of what happens in bankruptcy, or if 
 
 172. Id. at 2. 
 173. See id. 
 174. Second Amended Disclosure Statement with Respect to Second Amended Joint 
Plan of Reorg. of Debtors & Debtors in Possession at 32, Alpha Nat. Res., Inc., No. 15-33896, ECF 
No. 2528. 
 175. See id. 
 176. See Jan Hoffman, Payout from a National Opioids Settlement Won’t Be as Big as 
Hoped, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/health/national-opioid-
settlement.html [https://perma.cc/LX7R-UV73].  
 177. See id. 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:766 2021 
810 
they struggle to estimate exposure, they will incline to bid cautiously and 
abstain from complementary investment. Consequently, the value of the 
debtor’s assets could be depressed. A virtue of existing bankruptcy prac-
tice, under this line of thought, is its capacity to match the debtor’s assets 
with an optimal balance sheet. 
But this line of criticism understates the capacity both of market insti-
tutions to respond to the possibility of a new source of debt overhang and 
of creditors themselves to bargain around the problem when it manifests. 
Despite the conventional wisdom—and the approximation we ourselves 
have indulged—that a buyer or reorganized company takes the debtor’s 
assets free-and-clear of involuntary claims, the reality is more complicated. 
Existing law draws exceptions to the rule. Tort claims arising post-petition, 
for example, can pass onto the reorganized firm.178 Many environmental 
obligations likewise pass through bankruptcy to successor entities.179 These 
rules do not seem to have prevented resources from being put to produc-
tive use, however. What they have done is encourage the development of 
insurance markets to reduce risk and, if the empirical results are to be be-
lieved, induce legal compliance.180  
There is also every reason to think that tort claimants would bargain 
with other stakeholders to relinquish durability when debt overhang would 
otherwise threaten their joint return. In cases where it might matter, tort 
claimants—or a representative in the bankruptcy—should be willing to re-
linquish durability. If an asset sale is the preferred resolution and an attrac-
tive buyer requires certainty or lower leverage, tort creditors can maximize 
their own recovery by surrendering durability. If a bona fide reorganiza-
tion is the preferred resolution, tort creditors might be able to maximize 
their recovery by accepting equity. This is not to say that every mutually 
agreeable deal will in fact be concluded. That would be a fantasy. But be-
tween direct bargains and third-party mediated solutions, a super-durabil-
ity norm seems unlikely to challenge the economic imperative of assuring 
the productive use of resources. Instead it looks like a mechanism for put-
ting involuntary creditors in a stronger bargaining position and thereby in-
creasing their expected recovery. 
Ultimately, though, a durability norm could be expected to produce 
partially offsetting effects relative to the status quo: pro-social ex-ante in-
centives, but at the risk of putting assets to less than their highest-value use 
ex post. How these effects should be expected to trade off depends on facts 
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about bankruptcy institutions—roughly speaking, the agility of creditors 
and judges—on which reasonable minds can differ. 
IV. Objections 
We have promoted the super-durability strategy on pragmatic 
grounds. A motivating premise is the political infeasibility of legislative so-
lutions to bankruptcy’s tort problem. State legislatures are not going to re-
voke shareholder limited liability for corporate torts, and Congress is not 
going to add a super-priority rule for tort creditors to the Bankruptcy Code 
any time soon. Because turnabout is fair play, our own proposal must sur-
vive a reality check. In this Part, we outline and respond to the two most 
important practical objections to our approach. 
A. Chapter 11 Avoidance 
The first objection is that those who would lose from a system with 
super-durable tort claims will avoid using Chapter 11 even where using it 
would maximize economic value. Chapter 11 is not the only way for a com-
pany’s financial distress to be resolved.181 A variety of state-law mecha-
nisms—the receivership, the foreclosure sale, the assignment for the bene-
fit of creditors—can preserve a going concern, even if they are frequently 
clumsy for sizeable operations. The same mechanisms, along with Chapter 
7 of the Bankruptcy Code, can also be used to resolve distress with a piece-
meal liquidation of the business’s assets. 
The financial creditors of a company with significant tort liabilities 
might lobby to use one of these other mechanisms if Chapter 11 were to 
become sufficiently hostile. Claimants may prefer to be paid first out of a 
relatively small pool of assets than to be paid second out of a relatively big 
pool. The risk is that super-durability becomes a kind of Maginot principle. 
If the interests of tort creditors are heavily fortified in Chapter 11—but 
only there—then the managers and financial creditors of a distressed busi-
ness might just go around it.182 
There is, however, reason to suspect that Chapter 11 avoidance would 
have only modest effects on the managerial incentives to take precautions 
that motivate our project. 
First, state-law reorganization mechanisms do not reliably extinguish 
tort creditors’ claims. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, properly 
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conducted foreclosure sales extinguish junior liens,183 but do not shield 
buyers that are “mere continuations” of the seller from claims founded on 
successor liability.184 Successor liability theories likewise survive a re-
ceiver’s sale of assets on a going-concern basis, even if the sale order says 
otherwise.185 State-law reorganization mechanisms thus resemble our “less 
aggressive” implementation of super-durability in their treatment of tort 
creditors. Put differently, our “less aggressive” proposal is a proposal to 
undo the bankruptcy-specific practice of extinguishing successor liability. 
Financial creditors might for that reason prefer state-law mechanisms to 
our “more aggressive” implementation. But the magnitude of the differ-
ence is uncertain and would have to be traded off against the procedural 
advantages of a bankruptcy forum. In short, it will be hard to escape some 
kind of super-durability rule if reorganization rather than liquidation is in 
the cards. 
Piecemeal liquidations, by contrast, generally do extinguish successor 
liability. They prevent any one buyer of a debtor’s assets from plausibly 
being understood as the debtor’s “mere continuation.”186 Buyers in a liqui-
dation therefore have no need to discount their offers, as they do in a go-
ing-concern sale. At the margin, a Chapter 11 norm of super-durability for 
tort claims should thus tip financial creditors toward Chapter 7 or another 
form of liquidation.187 If, that is, a debtor’s assets would be equally valuable 
sold piecemeal or as a going-concern, financial creditors would have reason 
to prefer and lobby for liquidation. 
It is likely, however, that the magnitude of any dislocation will be 
small. Simple economics are the most important reason. The assets of via-
ble businesses are typically worth much more sold intact than as scrap.188 
But financial creditors have an incentive to lobby for liquidation only if the 
expected proceeds from liquidation exceed those from a going-concern 
sale (or the value otherwise received in a reorganization). For most viable 
companies, that condition could be satisfied only if they tort claims were 
perceived to be very large. 
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Managerial freedom to choose a debtor’s path is at its ebb in just such 
cases. Debtors can face immediate judicial second-guessing if they pursue 
a wasteful liquidation in bankruptcy. In extreme cases, junior creditors may 
seek to convert a Chapter 7 case to Chapter 11.189 Bankruptcy judges would 
presumably be especially keen to offer relief in precisely the cases where 
financial creditors might be tempted to sacrifice aggregate value for indi-
vidual priority. Debtors face less immediate scrutiny if they seek to wind 
up a business under state law, but the scrutiny comes. The directors of in-
solvent companies are liable to their creditors for waste.190 To be sure, 
waste is not easy to prove. Judges are hesitant to use generic doctrines of 
corporate law to protect creditor interests.191 But it is hard to imagine a 
stronger case than where it looks like the existence of large tort debts has 
motivated a board to dissipate value through an unnecessary liquidation.  
On top of that, outside of bankruptcy, piecemeal liquidations do not 
always extinguish successor liability. Some courts have created a product 
line exception to the general rule of non-liability for successors. Under this 
exception, if the successor uses a product developed by the seller, and the 
product turns out to be deficient, the successor can be held liable for tort 
claims that can be tied to the use of the deficient product.192 Versions of 
the product line exception are now used in California, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, and Pennsylvania.193 The product line exception is a 
judicial innovation.194 Bankruptcy judges, too, could use their equitable 
powers to impose successor liability on whatever entity purchases assets 
that give rise to tort claims.  
None of this is to say that a super-durability norm could be imple-
mented without any strategic reaction. On the margin, such a norm would 
induce financial creditors in cases with large tort liabilities to avoid Chap-
ter 11. But the costs of that effect could (a) occasionally be managed by 
bankruptcy judges, and (b) appear to be second-order.195 
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B. The Political Economy of Bankruptcy Courts 
The other important objection is that the political economy of bank-
ruptcy courts will prevent implementation of our approach however sound 
it may be in theory. The idea is that our approach will not in fact be imple-
mented in cases where it matters. We take this objection seriously, but it 
misses the register of our argument and overestimates the stability of cur-
rent practice.  
Bankruptcy’s liberal venue rule underlies a contentious literature 
about the political economy of Chapter 11.196 A corporation may initiate 
bankruptcy in the judicial district in which it is incorporated, the district in 
which it conducts its principal business, or, crucially, in any district in which 
an affiliate’s case is pending.197 With minimal advance planning, then, busi-
nesses of any size can in effect choose from among the 94 judicial districts. 
In practice, most large companies file in one of only a very few districts, 
including Delaware and the Southern District of New York. 
Commentators are divided on what to make of these facts. Some ex-
plain the dominance of a few districts as the product of a race to the bot-
tom.198 They argue that flexible venue, coupled with judges’ natural and 
subtle—yet pervasive—interest in participating in important and interest-
ing reorganizations, yields a perverse political economy.199 In equilibrium, 
cases are predominantly filed in districts with local rules and procedures 
favorable to managers and others (especially senior creditors) who decide 
where to file—and all the more so if bankruptcy judges actively cater to 
the interests of these case placers. Others argue that competition for cases 
has yielded generally efficient practices, through a combination of judicial 
expertise and network effects.200 On this view, the predictability of modern 
 
 196. For an early assessment of the terms of debate, see Barry E. Adler & Henry N. 
Butler, On the “Delawarization of Bankruptcy” Debate, 52 EMORY L.J. 1309 (2003). 
 197. 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2018). 
 198. Cf. Cary, supra note 60. 
 199. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE (2005); Laura Napoli Coordes, The 
Geography of Bankruptcy, 68 VAND. L. REV. 381 (2015); Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. 
LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Re-
organizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (1999); Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of 
Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the 
Bottom,” 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 (2001); Samir D. Parikh, Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy, 
46 CONN. L. REV. 159 (2013); Anthony Casey & Joshua C. Macey, Bankruptcy Shopping: Domes-
tic Venue Races and Global Forum Wars, EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. (2021) (forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3789994 [https://perma.cc/ 
SN93-8VK5]. 
 200. See Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based Explanation for 
Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425 (2006); Marcus Cole, “Dela-
ware Is Not a State”: Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional Competition in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. 
L. REV. 1845 (2002); Jared A. Ellias, What Drives Bankruptcy Forum Shopping? Evidence from 
Market Data, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 119 (2018) (finding greater predictability of outcomes in Dela-
ware and Southern District of New York, but no evidence of bias); Robert K. Rasmussen & Ran-
dall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. 
 
Claim Durability and Bankruptcy’s Tort Problem 
815 
Chapter 11 practice, which is possible only if a few courts handle most of 
the complex reorganizations, attracts capital to distressed businesses and 
so (in expectation) may be to everyone’s advantage.201 
One need not have a general view of the venue debate, however, to 
sense that tort creditors might not fare well. For venue competition to yield 
an efficient result on a particular matter despite managers’ unilateral 
power, a feedback mechanism of one kind or another is crucial. In other 
words, the managers who select venue must be forced to “pay” for their 
choices, and so internalize the costs of those choices on others. There are 
plausible mechanisms when it comes to financial creditors, who can take 
collateral, charge excess interest, or decline to lend altogether to distressed 
businesses who provide inadequate assurances about how bankruptcy, if 
necessary, will go. If the feedback mechanism is robust, then the “selected” 
venues will be those that pay heed to financial creditors’ and managers’ 
interests. Tort victims, by contrast, have no leverage and so in a competi-
tive system will tend to be on the wrong side of discretionary calls. Super-
durability strategies depend on judicial discretion. Therefore, the argu-
ment goes, super-durability is not part of a stable equilibrium. 
We have three responses. First, the objection misses the register of 
our project. Our appeal is directly to bankruptcy judges’ sense of what it 
means to judge well. We are saying that the right way to handle debtors 
with substantial tort claims is to cause those claims to persist through bank-
ruptcy. It is no answer to such an argument to respond that corporate man-
agers will not like it. To be sure, there are situations where a course of 
action is so plainly incentive incompatible, or so obviously depends on uni-
versal virtue, that it is useless to propose. But a super-durability strategy is 
nothing of the sort. Bankruptcy judges are first and foremost lawyers who 
have taken an oath to apply legal principles impartially. The bankruptcy 
bench consists of a relatively small group of people—350 at last count—
who associate professionally and socially and share a culture. No one’s ca-
reer or well-being is on the line. 
Second, and related, it is easy to overstate as a matter of fact the com-
petitive pressure to disregard best practices that protect tort victims. The 
future-claimant trust is a case in point. A major problem in the asbestos 
cases in the 1980s was that not all who had been harmed by exposure had 
manifested symptoms by the time a producer’s bankruptcy.202 If all of the 
available assets were distributed to existing creditors as of the time of the 
bankruptcy, the so-called future claimants would recover nothing. The 
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answer developed specifically for the asbestos bankruptcies—deposit as-
sets in trust for the future claimants203—is sound in cases likely to see future 
claimants. But preserving assets for future claimants also diminishes the 
recoveries of current claimants, including financial creditors, shareholders, 
and managers. A theory of robust competition predicts that bankruptcy 
courts would therefore disfavor their use. To the contrary, however, fu-
ture-claimant trusts have become a standard feature of practice in bank-
ruptcy courts throughout the country.204 
Third, the liberal venue rule itself may not last. Bills introduced in 
both houses of Congress in the last three years would curtail managers’ 
ability to choose their bankruptcy court, requiring them instead to file in 
the judicial district of their principal place of business.205 Attempts to alter 
bankruptcy venue have come and gone since the Bankruptcy Code was 
enacted in 1978. Recent attempts could of course likewise prove fruitless. 
But there is reason to think support for constraining managers is stronger 
now than in the past.206 If venue choice is eliminated or even sharply re-
stricted, then objections to our approach grounded in bankruptcy’s politi-
cal economy would be moot. Congress, it seems, is more likely to eliminate 
forum shopping than it is to give tort claimants a super-priority claim. 
Conclusion 
For decades, bankruptcy’s tort problem has facilitated antisocial con-
duct. Bankruptcy has allowed debtors to pay financial creditors before sex-
ual abuse victims, opioid addicts, environmental claimants, and wildfire 
casualties. Academic solutions that look elegant in theory have proven im-
possible to implement. This Article has shown that a durability norm is in 
many respects theoretically equivalent to the super-priority rule for which 
scholars have long advocated. Unlike a super-priority rule, however, bank-
ruptcy judges could implement a super-durability norm without congres-
sional action. 
This is not to say that a super-durability norm is without costs. Uncer-
tainty, asymmetric information, and debt overhang could prevent buyers 
from purchasing assets even when those assets could be put to productive 
use. As we have explained, however, there is reason to think that these 
problems are not intractable. Even a durability norm that blocked socially 
productive asset sales would not necessarily be fatal to our argument. 
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Bankruptcy involves tradeoffs. By definition, an insolvent firm cannot 
honor all of its obligations. There is a real cost to preventing valuable assets 
from being put to productive use, but so too is it inefficient to allow firms 
to exploit the bankruptcy process to externalize social costs. In a world of 
tradeoffs, it is not obvious that the benefits of ensuring that socially valua-
ble assets are put to productive use always outweighs the benefits of forcing 
firms to internalize the costs of socially harmful behavior. 
 
